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Abstract 
In the recent years, the EU has become an increasingly integrated foreign policy actor. 
On this note, a growing body of scholarly research on the EU's foreign policy actions 
can be observed. Particularly Ian Manners' notion of 'Normative Power Europe' has led 
to a new strand of theorising on the EU's foreign policy actions. Manners states that 
while the EU is one foreign policy actor among others, it is not only very different in its 
institutional arrangement, but also does it account for different foreign policy goals than 
traditional state actors. The EU namely pursues 'normative goals' which aim to alter the 
international political environment, instead of economically defined 'possession goals'. 
Due to the fact that Manners utilises case-study methodology in order to prove the con-
cept of 'Normative Power Europe', further case studies in various foreign policy fields 
lend themselves to verify or falsify the theoretical claims around the concept. In accor-
dance to this, the research of this thesis aims to test Manners' notion by conducting a 
case study in the policy field of non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
related material. 
In order to do so, firstly a theoretical subsumption of Manners' concept of 'Normative 
Power Europe' is conducted, which includes normative foreign policy analysis as well 
as role theory.  
By means of these theoretical tenets as an explanatory framework, the research of this 
thesis suggests that role conflicts within the EU's non-proliferation policy actions 
emerge frequently, which undermines consistent action of the EU in this policy field. 
This can be understood in terms of non-adherence to self-set normative foreign policy 
goals: The research of this thesis suggests that the EU's goals and actions in non-
proliferation do not correspond sufficiently. Furthermore, in this thesis, these role-
conflicts are exemplified by a case study on the EU's non-proliferation policy towards 
India, in which non-proliferation goals have been abandoned in favour of economically 
defined goals. By means of the results from the analysis of existing data and the con-
ducted case study, Manners' theoretical notion of 'Normative Power Europe' has been 
refuted. Accordingly, in the light of the available data and the conducted case study, the 
EU cannot be regarded as a consistent normative foreign policy actor in the policy field 
of non-proliferation. 
Key words: EU, Normative Power Europe, Ian Manners, Foreign Policy, Normative 
Foreign Policy, Role Theory, Non-Proliferation, Non-Proliferation Regime, WMD, 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, India 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has always been a contested and debated object of investigation in the 
studies of International Relations (IR). Numerous scholars have filled libraries with research on the 
EU's origins, nature, motivations and purpose. Neither is it a federal state, nor is it a loose coopera-
tion agreement among European states. Nevertheless did the EU attain governmental capacities and 
related institutional structures which have evolved ever since the end of the 1950s. The ongoing 
development of economic and political integration in Europe has never come to a halt. The EU has 
gone down the path of reshaping the political landscape of Europe against the odds of numerous 
drawbacks and crises, as well as a current resurgence in the notion of national sovereignty among 
its member states. 
Previously, the Treaty on the European Union (TEU or Maastricht in the following) from 1992 and 
the Treaty of Lisbon from 2007 have incrementally altered the structural setup of the EU and the 
way the EU conducts its affairs. By overcoming the former three-pillar structure of the EU since the 
TEU in Maastricht in 1993 and replacing it with a single merged legal personality in Lisbon in 
2007, the EU further widened its scope of political action. This is also true for the field of external 
political action: the recently erected European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority 
of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) serves as the diplomatic 
service of the EU and proposes and implements foreign policy measures. 
However, the development of the EU's foreign policy capabilities is not limited to the well-known 
and much discussed big treaty advancements and the connected policies that make headlines in 
newspapers. They must be seen as parts of the big puzzle that is the EU's foreign policy. By limiting 
one's view to the big treaty advancements, a true understanding of the EU's foreign policy cannot 
emerge. Comprehensive research on EU-foreign policy actions must therefore carefully take all 
developmental steps of various concerned institutions, their positions and related policies into con-
sideration. It is academia that has to conduct careful research on policy fields that are subordinated 
to the label of foreign policy. True progress in research on a given EU-policy field thus can only 
take place if the focus on it has been narrowed down sufficiently. 
One EU-related foreign-policy field that has not experienced an abundance of scholarly attention is 
the externally oriented non-proliferation policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and re-
lated Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) material. While political comments 
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and research often focus on the role of the E3+3 negotiation rounds with Iran (Sauer 2007), or on 
the EU's role in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conferences (Müller 2005, Katsioulis 
and Mölling 2010) and therefore pose research on the EU as one actor among others in the non-
proliferation regime, this thesis will follow more ideational questions on the EU's 'actorness' in non-
proliferation policy actions (Jupille and Caporaso 1998). 
More specifically, this thesis aims to discuss the EU's non-proliferation policy against the back-
ground of the 'Normative Power Europe' (NPE) theory framework 
1
, as introduced by Ian Manners 
in 2002. The initial motivation to refer to Manners theoretical treatise stems from the fact that while 
it is a relatively novel approach to study the EU, its applicability as a research concept has stirred up 
a lively academic debate. NPE can be regarded as a research programme which fully refutes a re-
search perspective on the EU in a Westphalian understanding of 'actorness' in world politics; in-
stead, a tailor made perspective on the EU as an actor in foreign policy is needed. 
On this note, this thesis will comprise theory testing and theory building exercises. The research of 
this thesis will show that Manners' theoretical notion of NPE can partly be refuted. This is possible 
due to the fact that Manners utilises case study methodology for his theory-building on NPE: Com-
peting test-cases can either lead towards an affirmation of its theoretical tenets and its explanatory 
power, or towards their refutation. While Manners abstracts his theoretical findings on the EU being 
a normative power from a case study on the spread of European norms against the death penalty, the 
research of this thesis will shed light on a different policy area and test the validity of NPE by 
means of its own case study, namely the EU's non-proliferation policy towards India. By means of 
this case study, it will be argued that while the EU is a seemingly integrated normative actor in the 
policy field of non-proliferation, it does not coherently adhere to self-defined normative rationale 
behind its institutional frame. The background for this study is the EU's extensive legal framework 
in the policy area of non-proliferation, which consists of various foreign-policy strategies and insti-
tutions. The development and setup of these will be depicted in this thesis. This delineation will 
highlight the normative foundations of the EU's non-proliferation policies, actions and action plans, 
the EU's WMD Strategy as well as the related non-proliferation clause. The non-proliferation 
clause will subsequently serve as the main object of investigation, as by means of an analysis of this 
policy tool, the case study of this thesis will be approached. 
Constitutive for the analysis of the EU's capabilities and its policy actions in non-proliferation is a 
literature review on IR theories, which will help to shed light on the EU's specific 'actorness' in non-
                                                          
1
 In the following, 'NPE' will be utilised synonymously with the depiction of the whole research programme of "Norma-
tive Power Europe", which will be depicted in chapter 2.1. 
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proliferation policies. More specifically, the theories employed are the NPE theory framework as 
defined by Manners, normative foreign policy analysis, as well as sociological role theory. While 
this literature review aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the theories, it should be 
stressed that the depicted key tenets of the theories will be employed in the analytical discussion on 
the non-proliferation clause in order to conduct the theory testing exercise of key tenets of NPE. By 
means of a tailor-made research perspective which incorporates the necessary aforementioned theo-
retical tenets, the analysis of the case study will help gain an understanding of the EU's specific 
actions as a non-proliferation actor. 
However, this does not mean that a literature review on case study and/or IR-methodology will pose 
as the result of this thesis. In fact, all the necessary steps of methodology and theory-development 
of this thesis will take place against the background of the topics being discussed. By means of this 
approach, a coherent research framework between methodology, content and theoretical considera-
tions will form the results of this thesis, ideally achieving the intended research objective of refuting 
Manners' notion of NPE in the specific policy area of non-proliferation. The more convincing and 
insusceptible to failure in theory- and hypothesis-testing this will prove to be, the more an under-
standing of the true nature of the EU's non-proliferation policy can be achieved. The analysis of the 
non-proliferation clause in the case of India will highlight that while the EU accounts for a norma-
tive foundation of its non-proliferation policies, it does not always and coherently adhere to self-set 
standards, principles and norms regarding its foreign policy actions in this policy field. 
Furthermore, this thesis aims to show that the case study is a test-case for a certain kind of EU-
activity. Normative reasoning can be found behind EU-policy and legislation in various policy 
fields. The EU's non-proliferation policy must therefore be seen as one case among others. The re-
search conducted in the thesis will thus help to contextualise the EU's non-proliferation policy in the 
wider frame of the foreign policy actions of the EU. This research perspective and focus serves as 
an explanation for the one-sided approach within the conducted case study. While it would be feasi-
ble to discuss the EU's non-proliferation policy within the stress field of the international prolifera-
tion regime and bilateral relations with India, the focus and the method of this study solely puts the 
focus on the 'actorness' of the EU. 
1.2. Working hypothesis and research question 
If the thesis is to succeed in theory-advancement by means of the falsification of existing theory, or 
in the theory framework of NPE (as will be elaborated further in the methodology chapter), a guid-
ing working hypothesis which will be verified or falsified through theory testing must be provided. 
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This working hypothesis includes the theoretical considerations mentioned above, as well as the 
background of the EU's actions in the non-proliferation regimes: 
The EU is a normative actor in the international non-proliferation regime of CBRN weapons 
and related material, it exercises adherence to self-set standards and norms. The EU's non-
proliferation actions toward India demonstrate the consistency of the EU as a normative ac-
tor; the EU's exercise of adherence to these norms further supports the theoretical construct 
of the EU being a normative actor in international relations. 
We note that the working hypothesis has been formulated in this way, as falsification of hypotheses 
leads to theory advancement through theory testing. This takes place against the background of the 
given evidence from chapter 5., namely the fact that the available data supports the claim that the 
EU does not adhere to the norms mentioned above. As will become apparent in this thesis, this no-
tion is closely connected to Manners' conception of NPE. Only by re-evaluation of theory, a more 
precise and concrete understanding of our social world can come into place. 
This working hypothesis will guide the research of this thesis and it is specifically constructed in 
this manner in order to answer the following research question: 
Is the European Union a consistent normative foreign policy actor in the policy area of non-
proliferation of CBRN weapons and related material? 
By discussing and inevitably answering this research question, the theory testing exercise on the 
explanatory power of NPE will be conducted. By discussing whether the EU is a consistent or in-
consistent foreign policy actor in the area of non-proliferation, Manners' theoretical notion of NPE 
will be refuted in the light of the provided case study and data sample. 
In the following, a literature review on the theories of Normative Power Europe, normative foreign 
policy as well as role theory will be depicted. This aims to serve several purposes: firstly, the litera-
ture review will help to contextualise this thesis in the existing research, namely on the crossway 
connecting International Relations and European Studies. Secondly, we note that the specifications 
from the literature review are deeply interconnected with the research puzzle of this thesis. A cate-
gorisation and discussion of the EU's foreign policy tools against the background of the research 
question is not possible without the attainment of a suitable research perspective. An accurate de-
piction of these theories' key tenets is crucial for the analysis of the EU's non-proliferation policies: 
the concluding case study of this thesis will help to refute Manners' theoretical notion of Normative 
Power Europe in the policy field of non-proliferation. 
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2. THEORY 
The following chapter will provide a comprehensive overview of the ongoing scholarly debate on 
normative foreign policy and the European Union's conduct of foreign policy as an actor in the in-
ternational political system. The resulting deliberations will pose the theoretical foundation for the 
discussion of the EU's non-proliferation policies in the analytical chapter of this thesis. 
Firstly, Ian Manners' concept of Normative Power Europe will be elaborated, as the scholarly de-
bate on normatively coined foreign policy of the EU has been most prominent among EU-studies 
scholars in the recent past. However, not only Manners' original conception of Normative Power 
Europe will be depicted. Instead, critics who highlight strengths and shortcoming of the theory, as 
well as Manners' own theory advancement will be appended to the discussion. This discussion ful-
fils several important conditions in the wider context of this thesis. Not only will this discussion 
depict an initial and contextualising framework for the discussion of the nature of the EU's foreign 
policy and most importantly the EU's non-proliferation policies: The theory testing and theory ad-
vancement exercise of this thesis is dependent on a coherent and intelligible foundational disquisi-
tion on existent research on the topic. The findings from the depiction of the concept of Normative 
Power Europe bear important implications for the subsequent part of this literature review, namely 
the discussion on the concept of normative foreign policy. Furthermore, we note that it is imperative 
for the success of the theory-testing exercise of this thesis to embed the present discussions into 
existing research on the EU as a foreign policy actor. Manners' conception of NPE can only be re-
futed if its theoretical key tenets are convincingly disclosed. The means to achieve this will further 
be elaborated in the methodology-chapter of this thesis. 
Secondly, an illustration of the concept of normative foreign policy will take place. This discussion 
aims to carry on the initial focus of the following theoretical considerations and discussions of this 
thesis not only on foreign policy itself, but rather specifically the concept of normative foreign pol-
icy; namely what its conditions are and how to depict and categorise it within the set of existing 
foreign policy types. The discussion on this is heavily aligned towards Tocci's theoretical frame-
work from Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?, which aims to pose an analytical basis for 
various kinds of EU foreign policies. In this volume, several authors provide case studies in which 
the nature of various EU foreign policies are evaluated and categorised. As will be argued later in 
this thesis, the case study of the EU's non-proliferation policies towards India can be seen as one 
case study among other existing ones in the provided statistical sample from chapter 5.2.. At the end 
of the discussion on Tocci's ideas, a comprehensive theoretical framework on key tenets of norma-
tive foreign policy will stand. This will bear important implications for the discussion on the nature 
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of the EU's non-proliferation policies in the analytical part of this thesis, and it will help to test 
whether they can be regarded as normative or not. 
Thirdly, an excursion into sociological role theory will take place. As will be argued in the follow-
ing, role theory can be applied on an International Relations based level of analysis. Furthermore, it 
will be noted that the theory can provide an explanatory basis for how and why a specific foreign 
policy actor is behaving in a given way. The considerations following these notions will be of high 
significance for the analytical part of this thesis, as they will directly be applied in the employed 
case study. The incorporation of role theory into the theoretical framework of this thesis will help to 
facilitate the discussion of the research question. While the aforementioned theories can help to gain 
a perspective on the normativity of a foreign policy actor such as the EU, we note that they alone 
are insufficient for analysing the specific actorness and the track record of the EU in the policy area 
of non-proliferation. Accordingly, role theory must be regarded as being crucial for the theory de-
velopment exercise of this thesis. 
The findings from this literature review pose the basis for the research framework, which will be 
depicted in chapter 5.1.. While this could possibly be placed right after the literature review, the 
author of this thesis decided to let it precede the analytical discussion for the sake of easier readabil-
ity. This consolidating discussion aims to merge the theoretical concepts listed above which will be 
applied in the analysis. The resulting explanatory framework will be heavily aligned towards the 
research question and the case study of this thesis. 
2.1. Normative Power Europe: Manners and his critics 
Ian Manners' concept of 'Normative Power Europe' has stirred an extensive debate among EU-
scholars. Not only does it challenge previous scholarly evaluations of the EU's role in international 
affairs such as Duchêne's concept of 'Civilian Power EU'. Even more, an incremental discussion 
which aims to rethink the nature of the EU's role as a foreign policy actor followed the publication 
of Manners' article from 2002. This discussion has branched out into a manifold discussion panel 
employing NPE as a research programme for various case studies in which specific EU foreign 
policies are tested against the background of the EU's normative foundations 
2
.  
The following discussion does not aim to merely list all advocates and critiques of Manners' con-
cept of NPE. Instead, a disquisition on parts of the theory framework which can be utilised for the 
                                                          
2
 See: Birchfield 2013, Diez 2005, Lenz 2013, Manners 2006a, Manners 2006b, Manners 2008, Manners 2013 for theo-
ry development of "NPE". See Hyde-Price 2006 and Hyde Price 2008 for realist critiques. See Afionis & Stinger 2013 
for a case study on environmental policy & EU-Brazil relations. See Whitman 2013 for an assessment of the theoretical 
impact of NPE in IR theory. 
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discussion of the research question will be highlighted; valuable contributions of other scholars will 
be added to this discussion. A coherent theoretical framework applicable to the research of this the-
sis will form the result of this treatise. This framework is complemented by the other two theoretical 
stances of this thesis, namely the concept of normative foreign policy, as well as role theory. While 
the first two will help to contextualise the EU as a normative foreign policy actor in international 
relations, role theory will set the basis for a theory advancement exercise in the analytical part of 
this thesis. 
Manners' initial motivation to engage into a theoretical discussion based on the EU's normative 
foundations dates back to Hedley Bull's notion of "the EU neither being an actor in international 
affairs nor likely becoming one" (Bull 1982: 151; ref. in: Manners 2002: 235). 
3
 Manners' own posi-
tion on the EU can be regarded as contrarily to this, as he suggests to fully rethink 'classic state cen-
tred' notions of military and civilian power. Instead as will be argued in the following, a research 
focus concentrated on more ideational, less state-centred, normative reasoning can best explain the 
rationale behind EU-policy. 
The starting point of Manners' argumentation refers back to Duchêne's concept of 'Civilian Power 
Europe', which includes three key notions defining the nature of the European Community. Firstly, 
economic power is regarded as central for achieving national goals. Secondly, international prob-
lems must be resolved by means of diplomatic cooperation, and thirdly, international progress can 
only be achieved by means of compliance of international actors with legally binding supranational 
institutions (Manners 2002: 236-237; ref. to: Twitchett 1976, 1-2; Maull 1990: 92-93, Duchêne 
1973). Bull highlighted these principles as being responsible for a perceived weakness and ineffec-
tiveness of the EC's security policy and a resulting dependence on NATO. Bull furthermore lobbied 
for a comprehensive military integration of the European continent in order to become a more self-
sufficient international security actor in the heydays of the Cold War (1982). 
While Bull's criticism is heavily based on a state-centred, Westphalian understanding of interna-
tional affairs, Manners rejects the idea of a theoretical 'European state-building exercise' in which a 
unified actor is striving for possession goals, as will be elaborated and defined in chapter 2.2.. Man-
ners specifically notes that the discussions on the concepts of civilian or military power mainly con-
centrate on "[…] how much like a state the EU looks like" (Manners 2002: 239). Contrarily, he 
notes that "[t]he EU has evolved into a hybrid of supranational and international forms of govern-
                                                          
3
 As Manners accurately depicts, Bull "[…] endangered himself to a generation of European studies scholars."(Manners 
2002: 236). 
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ance which transcends Westphalian norms", thus argues for a different view on the EU as an entity 
and international actor than on state actors (Manners 2002: 240; ref. to: King 1999: 313). 
Furthermore, Manners suggests that a theoretical focus on normative, rather than empirical vari-
ables serves best for gaining a deeper understanding of the international role of the EU. The princi-
ples of democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights form the ideological basis 
of the EU and were already mentioned in the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European identity. 
They were first translated into a constitutional framework within the TEU. While these norms have 
served as a constitutive and universal basis for the EU's relations to its member states, its external 
relations are based on "[…] a catalogue of norms which come close to those of the European con-
vention on human rights and fundamental freedoms (ECHR) and the universal declaration of human 
rights (UDHR) than most other actors in world politics." (Manners 2002: 241). Furthermore, the EU 
"[…] is committed to pursuing these norms in accordance with the ECHR (TEU, art. 6) and the 
'principles of the United Nations Charter' (TEU, art. 11, preamble to TEU)." (ibid.).  
However, the facts that the EU accounts for a normative basis which its foreign policies are based 
upon, and that the EU does not impose its norms on others by means of force still leaves us with the 
question which means the EU actually employs in order to reach its normative foreign policy goals. 
Manners notes that the EU's normative power rests upon six factors, which shape the diffusion of 
EU-based norms in international relations (Manners 2002: 244-245): 
Contagion Informational 
Diffusion 
Procedural Dif-
fusion 
Transference Overt Diffu-
sion 
Cultural 
Filter 
Unintentional 
diffusion of 
ideas from 
EU to other 
actors 
Strategic com-
munication, 
such as policy 
initiatives by 
EU institutions 
Institutionalisation 
of a relationship 
between EU and 
third party such as 
cooperation 
agreements or 
membership of the 
EU in interna-
tional organisa-
tions 
Diffusion 
through ex-
change of 
goods, aid, 
technical assis-
tance through 
substantive or 
financial 
means 
Physical pres-
ence of the EU 
in third states 
and interna-
tional organi-
sations 
Affects im-
pacts of inter-
national norms 
in third states 
leading to 
learning, 
adaption or 
rejection of 
norms 
 
Manners concludes with the statement that not only is the EU based on norms, but also does this 
predetermine the EU to act normatively in its international relations. As the research of this thesis 
will show, this notion is at least arguable. 
9 
 
Thomas Diez' article from 2005 is a direct response to Manners and serves as a theoretical reflec-
tion on the concept of NPE. Initially, Diez agrees with Manners on the notion that the EU is a new 
type of foreign policy actor, which relies on civilian rather than on military means in order to 
achieve normative goals rather than possession goals, such as geographical expansion or military 
might (Diez 2005: 613). However, in regard to the concept of 'Normative Power', which Manners 
defines as an actor's capability to influence what is considered as normal in international affairs, 
Diez provides three noteworthy addenda.  
Firstly, while Manners' research focus relies on a shift away from classic thinking in a state-centred 
manner, his understanding of 'power' actually bears a connotation of thinking in terms of 'great 
powers' or 'superpowers'. Within the line of reasoning presented in Manners' article from 2002, it is 
not advisable to employ a concept of 'power' which bears the characteristics of a unilateral exercise 
of influence/diffusion of norms towards a third party or an international organisation. As Diez em-
phasises, "[…] normative power is not only a specific kind of actor in international politics, but also 
connotes the characteristics of a relationship (in the Weberian sense of power as A being able to 
make B do what s/he would otherwise not have done)." (Diez 2005: 615-616). Furthermore, norma-
tive power must be examined in terms of the means which are utilised for norms diffusion. The 
concept of 'normative foreign policy means' will further be elaborated in chapter 2.2.. 
Secondly, Diez highlights the distinctly social constructivist ring of the concept of NPE:  
It focuses on the independent power of norms to influence actors’ behavior. […], a lot of the discus-
sion about ‘normative power Europe’ does not really examine the de facto impact of EU policy […] 
but on whether it acts as a normative power […]. (Diez 2005: 616) 
This statement must be regarded as highly valuable in terms of the development of a rather undif-
ferentiated theoretical notion such as 'Normative Power Europe' in its initial setup from the year 
2002. By means of a critical scientific discourse on theory, a better understanding of the social 
world can emerge. Diez' notion therefore called upon EU-studies scholars to widen the scientific 
perspective on NPE to an extent that actual policy actions are analysed. 
Thirdly, Diez notes that the concept of normative power should not be employed in an exclusionist 
manner. Rather than replacing other concepts of power, such as economic or military power, nor-
mative power should be seen as an addition to existing power conceptions. As a matter of fact, eco-
nomic and military power underpin normative power, as they increase the leverage of an actor in 
the international political system. However, normative power must still remain in its own category 
which is in need of further concretisations, specifications and deliberations, which will be provided 
in this thesis. 
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Diez' attempt to arrange the concept of NPE into the same line as Duchêne's concept of 'Civilian 
Power Europe' is worth being mentioned, as he successfully argues that both concepts follow a 
similar basic rationale. Manners himself however regarded the two concepts as distinct from one 
another. In fact, both concepts initially rely on the idea that a civilian/normative power is an actor 
"[…] whose conception of its foreign policy role and behaviour is bound to particular aims, values, 
principles, as well as forms of influence and instruments of power in the name of a civilisation of 
international relations." (Diez 2005: 617). Accordingly, both concepts are closely related to one 
another. Diez adds that civilian power can be regarded as a specific form of normative power which 
embodies a specific set of civilian norms (ibid.). 
Subsequent to Diez' critique on the initial definition of NPE, Manners did not only answer to this 
directly (Manners 2006b), but attempted to further develop and specify the theoretical underpin-
nings of the theoretical framework (Manners 2008; Manners 2013). In The normative ethics of the 
European Union from 2008, Manners initially refers to his previously stated notion of 'Normative 
Power' being the specific kind of power that lets specific norms appear as 'normal' in international 
politics. He adds that simply by means of the fact that the EU is conducting foreign policy the EU 
has already changed the 'normality of international relations'. Furthermore, by standing in between 
the relations of classic Westphalian-type actors and engaging itself in norms-export, the EU "[...] 
changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expecta-
tions of state-centricity." (Manners 2008: 45). However, Manners points at the seemingly ambiva-
lent meaning of his initial definition of NPE, as in fact there exists a difference between what an 
actor in international politics stands for and what the actor actually does, or more specifically, if it 
acts in a normative way. The idea of the EU being normative and powerful 
4
 at the same time is not 
contradictory: this idea is rather critically dependent on a working definition of what power means 
in the context of normative foreign policy. Accordingly, the dichotomy of these terms is not a con-
tradiction in itself; they rather complement one another if defined properly, as will be discussed in 
chapter 2.2.. 
Apart from these mainly theoretical considerations, Birchfield offers thoughts concerning how the 
concepts embedded in NPE can be empirically assessed by concentrating on how NPE functions as 
a policy framework (2013). Firstly, he notes that NPE is the first attempt at a theoretical categorisa-
tion of collective foreign policy actors (such as the EU) in the international political system, which 
focuses on a discourse on what kind of actor is actually being discussed. This stands in sharp oppo-
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 as in normative power 
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sition to realist conceptions of foreign policy actors which perform all the same functions, namely 
to follow self-defined interests in the international political system:  
Therefore, the extent to which the NPE framework places ontological questions front and center dis-
tinguishes it from most other approaches (with the possible exception of constructivism) that are 
specifically enlisted to explain the EU policymaking process. (Birchfield 2013: 908) 
According to this, NPE is specifically designed to discuss the EU's foreign policy actions, as op-
posed to other attempts to explain the EU's actions, which are 'borrowed' from research designs that 
were initially set up to discuss nation states. This ontological differentiation must be stressed and 
adds up to the descriptive power of NPE. On this note, Birchfield stresses that NPE "[…] can and 
should be deployed as an analytical framework of the EU policy process." (Birchfield 2013: 909). 
Connected to this stands the idea that by means of NPE, empirical and theoretical insights are gen-
erated from the core of the discussed entity itself, instead of being generated through an outlying 
perspective. As Birchfield stresses, this predisposes a sui generis nature of the EU as an actor in the 
international political system. It is reasonable to argue that the EU is a unique and different actor in 
foreign policy, which is sharing the same environment with other foreign policy actors. However, 
the specific and unique nature of the EU within this calls for a unique and tailor-made perspective 
not only on what this actor is, but also what it does and by which means. The discussion of these 
issues will not only stand in the centre of the discussion of chapter 2.2., but also pose the leitmotif 
of the theory-testing and theory-development exercise in this thesis.  
A heavy criticism of NPE is provided by Hyde-Price in a number of articles. In his first and most 
noteworthy article from 2006, Hyde-Price criticises NPE for overemphasising the 'distinctive Euro-
pean approach to international relations', which is founded on soft power as opposed to hard power. 
Opposed to the basic rationale offered by normative theory as explained above, Hyde-Price clings 
to thinking in Cold-War terms. While he tries to offer constructive criticism on several aspects of 
the NPE framework, his criticism reads as he himself is offended by the idea that hard power might 
not be the only thing that accounts for constitutive power in international politics: instead of engag-
ing in theory-testing in order to advance or refute parts of the NPE-framework, the whole ideational 
basis of NPE is questioned in rather reductionist terms. Firstly, Hyde-Price states that 'liberal-
idealist' approaches in IR are reductionist. Secondly, these approaches fully neglect hard power. 
Thirdly, they lack a critical distance as NPE employs an ethically non-neutral definition of what is 
normative. 
5
 However, instead of engaging in a discussion regarding these three items, he has stated 
them as if they were self-explanatory. Rather, he merely continues to appraise the virtues of the 
                                                          
5
 the ethically non-neutral definition will be elaborated and defined in chapter 2.2. 
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neorealism being "[…] one of the most sophisticated and influential theories of international poli-
tics, […]" while pointing out that it has not sufficiently been applied to European foreign security 
and defence policy (Hyde-Price 2006: 218).  
What follows in this article is a treatise of the basic tenets of the neorealist theory framework in 
terms of unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, balance of power, self-help systems and the like. 
Based on these theoretical considerations, Hyde-Price aims to provide an initial framework for the 
discussion of the EU as an actor in the international political system. Due to his theoretical focus 
which remains on states as the main actors within the EU and which dismisses the idea of the EU as 
being an actor on its own, this thesis resists the urge of including Hyde-Price's criticism into the 
theory-testing exercise. The ideational foundation of European integration over the course of its 
development, as well as the normative basis of the EU's foreign policy can convincingly be de-
picted, as will be shown in chapters 4.2. - 4.4. of this thesis. As this thesis will argue, a simple and 
reductionist differentiation of hard power / soft power and thinking in Westphalian terms when ana-
lysing foreign policy outcomes of the EU is not constructive. 
While the development and specifications of the terms employed in the NPE framework are ongo-
ing, its impact on IR-theory is already apparent. Whitman's thesis from 2013 convincingly classifies 
NPE into the existing landscape of IR theories. His main contribution to the NPE debate further 
highlights the basic rationale behind NPE which classifies the EU as a new kind of actor in the in-
ternational political system. Not only does Whitman deploy a convincing narrative about Manners' 
initial motivation to engage in a novel discussion on what the EU is, but also he connects this narra-
tive to existing notions of the EU such as Duchêne's 'civilian power' concept and Galtung's 'ideo-
logical power' concept (Whitman 2013: 172). In what Whitman describes as the 'neo-normative 
turn', he does not only count Manners' NPE concept into one line with classics of the discipline such 
as Duchêne, but also he argues that the concept is independent from discussions of hard and soft 
power or civilian and military power, which has been a centrepiece of Hyde-Price's criticism on 
NPE. Instead, NPE points at the EU's aim to set standards for other foreign policy actors by means 
of the diffusion of norms instead of relying solely on military and economic sources (Whitman 
2013: 174). 
However, Whitman does not limit his article to merely describing the development and main tenets 
of NPE: he adds valuable criticism from various authors some of which will be employed in the 
analysis of this thesis. The notion of the EU being an 'inconsistent normative power' is convincing, 
as will be argued in this thesis. This notion carries a number of noteworthy implications. While it 
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does not refute the basic rationale behind NPE, it describes the efforts of scholars testing the NPE 
specifications against an empirical background. As various scholars have shown, the EU's track 
record of staying consistent with its normative foundations is mixed, to say the least (Whitman 
2013: 183). 
6
 This thesis will stand in one line with authors arguing that the EU does not always 
adhere to its normative foundations in the conduct of foreign policies. 
To conclude, we note that according to Manners, much of the research that is conducted on the EU 
as a foreign policy actor merely concentrates on empirical outcomes of foreign policy actions, "[…] 
without ever asking why the EU is or is not acting […]." (Manners 2008: 45). While the faceoff 
between realist / neorealist thinking and more constructivist / liberal / normative approaches in IR-
theory is ongoing, the research of this thesis will suggest that normative theory poses an adequate 
foundation for the discussion of the specific form of the EU's normative foreign policy, or more 
specifically, its external non-proliferation policies. However, the outcome of the EU's non-
proliferation policies must be tested against the background of its normative foundations and rea-
soning. Manners' initial conception of NPE is, as all new and emerging theory-frameworks, prone to 
receive fierce criticism from other scholars, as exemplified by Hyde-Price. The fact that the dis-
course on NPE has mainly been constructive by nature 
7
 shows that the theoretical framework NPE 
is unlikely to slip off into academic obscurity. Instead, further theory development of these terms 
and the NPE framework altogether through critical academic discourse and case studies is needed if 
NPE is to attain more credibility and explanatory power au contraire to classic, hard-power based 
narratives of foreign policy. 
2.2 Normative Foreign Policy 
A long withstanding discussion on the nature of the EU's foreign policy has taken place ever since it 
has appeared as foreign policy actor. Various scholars assign differing role-conceptions towards the 
EU, such as the EU being a civilian power (Duchêne 1973) or a normative power (Manners 2002, 
2006). Manners' notion has especially prompted a lively debate on the nature of the EU’s foreign 
policies. The conception 'Normal Power Europe' for example is a direct response to Manners' work 
(Pardo 2012). In order to discuss the EU's foreign policies (and more specifically: non-proliferation 
policies) in this thesis, a theoretical framework surrounding the notion of 'normative foreign policy' 
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 such as Aggestam and Hill 2008, Bailes 2008, Balfour 2006, Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008, Bicchi 2006, Diez 
and Pace 2007, Hettne and Söderbaum 2005, Lerch and Schwellnus 2006, Matlary 2008, Noutcheva 2009, Panebianco 
2006, Puetter and Wiener 2007, Wood 2009 
7
 see Diez 2005, Birchfield 2013, Diez 2005, Lenz 2013, Manners 2006a, Manners 2006b, Manners 2008, Manners 
2013, Whitman 2013 
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must be depicted. As the following theoretical outline will show, this aims to pose a solid basis for 
the discussion of the research question and working hypothesis of this thesis. 
The question of who or what is a normative foreign policy actor has long been discussed in the 
study of foreign policy, as Smith and Light point out (2001). However, which analytical framework 
for assessing normative foreign policies offers an adequate framework for the analysis of the EU's 
non-proliferation policies? Tocci draws a conceptual framework for the discussing of these notions, 
which is heavily based on a definition of the 'normative' referring to international law and institu-
tions, calling upon an 'universalisable' basis for the assessing of foreign policies (2008: 1). If the 
extent of normativity of the EU's non-proliferation policies is to be assessed (as stated in the work-
ing hypothesis and research question), international law, international institutions and international 
organisations pose a good point of departure. As this thesis will show, specifically these, in form of 
multilateral agreements and international organisations, pose the cornerstones of the international 
non-proliferation regime(s). 
Two possible working definitions of 'the normative' in the study of foreign policies exist, as Tocci 
points out. The first definition, which is also employed by Manners, refers to what is considered to 
be 'normal' in the international political system and is labelled as the 'ethically neutral' definition: 
Under such an interpretation, norms become closely associated with power, in so far as only major 
international actors have the power to shape or determine what is considered ‘normal’. […], all ma-
jor international actors would have ‘normative’ foreign policies by definition, in that they all con-
tribute to determining and shaping the ‘norm’ in international affairs. (Tocci 2008: 4; ref. to: Sjursen: 
2007) 
However, we note that this definition of the 'normative' will not be employed in the research of this 
thesis. Merely concentrating on which state has the means to influence and/or define what is con-
sidered as normal in international politics does not lead to a comprehensive framework in which 
different actors can be placed against the same benchmark. As will be highlighted in this thesis, a 
focus on international law and international organisations will serve best to depict the international 
non-proliferation regime(s). 
The 'ethically non-neutral' definition refers to a set of legitimate standards which are universally 
accepted. According to this, universally accepted norms of 'what is good' do exist in normative for-
eign policy. What this means in practice will be outlined in the following. However, some constric-
tive remarks on this working definition must be employed first. If a notion of universally legitimate 
standards of normative foreign policy is to be depicted, one-sided 'imperialistic impositions' of what 
is thought the be 'good' must be avoided, as "[d]oing so is not only problematic in and for itself, but 
would also lead us back to a definition of normativity which is inextricably tied to power and 
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power-based relations", which is exactly what is meant to be avoided in the research of this thesis 
(Tocci 2008: 4). Furthermore, we note that "[p]rojecting or coercively imposing specific norms with 
a claim to their universality amounts to little more than an imperialist export of one's chosen form 
of political organisation." (Tocci 2008: 5). According to this, if this thesis is to discuss the norma-
tive foreign policy and specifically the normative non-proliferation policies of the EU, EU-set stan-
dards and norms only tell one part of the story and account merely for one perspective on norms. 
While it is important to have a precise knowledge of the construction and setup of the EU's norms 
in this policy field, which will be provided in chapter 4.2. - 4.4., a working definition of normative 
foreign policies must be as closely linked to a legitimate notion of universality as possible. As 
Manners points out, the provision of external reference points can overcome this possible pitfall 
(2006a: 170-175). In the research of this thesis, this external reference point is depicted by the in-
ternational non-proliferation regime(s), which comprises a specific set of norms which are regarded 
as universal to varying degrees by international law. The development of the international non-
proliferation regime(s) will also be outlined in chapter 4.1.. 
In the following, a disquisition on the concept of normative foreign policy will follow, which con-
sists of three variables, as designed by Tocci. This will take place in order to set up a theoretical 
framework according to which the EU can be discussed as a normative actor in the non-
proliferation regime(s). 
The first variable of normative policy is the 'normative goal' variable, which concentrates on the 
question whether a foreign policy is planned normatively in its setup or not. One way of distin-
guishing between normative and non-normative foreign policy goals is to divide them into being 
value-, respectively interest-based policies. According to this, normative foreign policy goals are 
formulated against the backdrop of values; non-normative ones are interest-based. However, this 
approach entails inherent problems as seemingly same values can be interpreted in innumerable 
ways by different policy actors. Furthermore, values are often based on interest configurations, thus 
rendering the distinction offered at hand obsolete (Tocci 2008: 5-6). Instead, Tocci refers to Wolf-
ers' definition of 'milieu goals' as opposed to 'possession goals'. While possession goals aim at a 
nation's own interest in short-term gains limited to itself, milieu goals apply to the international en-
vironment and are pursued over an extended period of time: 
In directing its foreign policy toward the attainment of its possession goals, a nation is aiming at the 
enhancement or the preservation of one or more of the things to which it attaches value. […] Milieu 
goals are of a different character. Nations pursuing them are not out to defend or increase posses-
sions they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their national 
boundaries. (Wolfers 1962: 73; quoted in: Tocci 2008: 7) 
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According to Tocci, the pursuit of milieu goals, if successful, becomes manifest in international 
organisations, regimes and law. Accordingly, the sum of these poses a normative framework which 
structures relations of actors in the international political system in various policy areas (Risse 
2000: 15; ref. in: Tocci 2008: 8-9). Normative goals which are geared towards having a regulatory 
impact in international politics aim to bind all parties of the affected policy area, including the actor 
itself. To conclude, we restrictively note that international organisations, regimes and law are the 
also the result of international power relations. For example, political leverage in a given policy 
area 
8
 in the international political system results in a regime that corresponds more to the normative 
goal of this specific actor, than to the normative goal of an actor without the according leverage:  
It is particularly important to add this provisio because international law is also the product of inter-
national power relations and not a magic formula that perfectly objectivises and universalises norms. 
(Tocci 2008: 8) 
This notion corresponds to Manners' understanding of normative power on an initial level. Norma-
tive power for Manners is a power that manages "to shape conventions of the normal" and thus 
stands in the centre of his deliberations on the normative power of Europe (Manners 2002: 239-
240). While this notion does not refer to any actual precisely formulated foreign policy action plans, 
the very fact that the ideational normative foundation of the EU is closely related to the export of 
self-formulated and applied norms is noteworthy.  
The second variable is defined as 'normative means'. In essence, this variable refers to an actors' 
capability to enforce its normative goals in the given policy area: "To be normative, foreign policy 
must pursue normative goals through normative means." (Tocci 2008: 8). While foreign policies of 
states and empires have always been based on their own respective normative reasoning, the means 
to achieve these goals are not necessarily normative. Given the fact that normative foreign policy 
goals refer to milieu goals, the carrying out of a unilateral, imperialistic foreign policy in order to 
achieve possession goals cannot be regarded as normative. We note that this refers to the Manners' 
statement that a normative power rejects the notion of force and the willingness to use it in order to 
reach its normative goals:  
[…] in my formulation the central component of normative power Europe is that it exists as being 
different to pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a 
normative way. (Manners 2002: 242). 
The question about whether the means of a foreign policy are normative or not, refers to how policy 
instruments are used for achieving milieu goals, instead of merely which ones: 
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Methods based on joint ownership, cooperation and dialogue in principle hedge against the dangers 
of imposing allegedly ‘universal’ norms through sheer power and against the needs and desires of lo-
cal populations […]. These methods allow for and are driven by motivations which are ‘other-
empowering’ rather than ‘self-empowering’. (Tocci 2008: 9; ref. to: Manners 2006b) 
Accordingly, normative foreign policy means are defined  
[…] as instruments (regardless of their nature) that are deployed within the confines of law. Legality 
in the deployment of foreign policy instruments relates first to the legal commitments if a foreign 
policy actor towards itself, i.e., the deployment of foreign policies in respect of internal legal stan-
dards of democracy, transparency and accountability. (Tocci 2008: 10; ref. to: Stavridis 2001: 9) 
This focus on adherence to international law corresponds to the composition of normative foreign 
policy goals. Achieving milieu goals that are meant to influence universalised norms necessarily has 
to rely on the means listed in the definition mentioned above:  
While far from a perfect guide to normative action, in such situations the law ensures that choices are 
not crude reflections of political contingency, but rather are made within the boundaries of legally 
permissible acts. (Tocci 2008: 11). 
The third and last variable of normative foreign policies centres on the results of the conducted pol-
icy and runs under the label of 'normative impact':  
A normative impact is one where a traceable path can be drawn between an international player’s di-
rect or indirect actions and inactions (or series of actions) on the one hand and the effective building 
and entrenchment of an international rule-bounded environment on the other. (Tocci 2008: 11) 
The interplay of these three variables constitutes a normative foreign policy. However, a given for-
eign policy actor can only fully control the first two variables, as they are set up internally. The 
normative impact, while evidently being influenced by the actor, is the result of the interplay of all 
participating actors in the policy area on the international scale, thus being a superordinate aggre-
gate. 
Not all foreign policies comply with the conditions set for normative foreign policies mentioned 
above. Several forms of foreign policy can be depicted, depending on whether the two internal vari-
ables (goals and means) required for a normative foreign policy are applied or not. Four possible 
distinct foreign policy types emerge, as shown by the following matrix (Tocci 2008: 12): 
  Legitimisation of foreign policy goals 
  Normative Non-normative 
Foreign policy means Normative Normative Status Quo 
 Non-normative Imperial Realpolitik 
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The normative foreign policy is characterised by compliance of both, goals as well as means with 
the normative conditions mentioned above. Goals are promoted in accordance to normatively de-
fined milieu goals which strengthen international law and institutions, while neglecting short term 
possession goals. Internal and international commitments are adhered to. Realpolitik follows a con-
trarian rationale:  
Here an international actor pursues possession goals by deploying all policy instruments at its dis-
posal (coercive and non-coercive) regardless of its internal and international legal obligations. (Tocci 
2008: 13)  
The imperial foreign policy actor accounts for a normative rationale in its foreign policy goals. 
However, it does not bind itself to legal obligations such as compliance with international law or 
participation in international organisations. Last but not least, the status quo foreign policy actor 
does not formulate normative foreign policy goals, however, limits its actions (means) in that they 
comply with international law. The actor futhermore participates in international organisations 
(Tocci 2008: 12-13).  
While these factors are conditional for the internal setup of a foreign policy actor, additional con-
figuring conditions for the actor need to be addressed, in order to draw a coherent picture of a nor-
mative foreign policy actor. Firstly, the internal political context and the internal capability of the 
actor are important. The initial formulation of the milieu goal is important for its subsequent suc-
cess. Relevant stakeholders related to the affected policy area (such as politicians, civil society, 
NGOs or business, e.g.) may utilise their influence and leverage in order to reach a configuration of 
the milieu goal which they envision. Furthermore, the modus operandi in which milieu goals are 
carried out needs to be taken into consideration. This refers not only to the political system of a 
given state, but also to all relevant interest groups and their respective influence in both, the formu-
lation of the normative foreign policy goals, as well as to the capability of these actors to agree 
upon a common strategy and eventually deploy these. The more unified an actor is in this sense the 
more likely it is that the formulated goals may be achieved through unified action and with effective 
means to do so. The available means of the actor are closely connected to this internal notion: 
strong military power or economic influence may not only lead to an advantage in the pursuit of 
milieu goals, but also effectively breach internal law and thus influence a given policy area or pol-
icy regime directly, unilaterally (Tocci 2008: 16-18). 
Secondly, the normative impact of a given policy must be taken into consideration. As Tocci notes, 
a foreign policy impact can be intended or unintended: Intended impacts correspond with the goal; 
unintended impacts do not correspond with the goal. This applies to both, normative as well as non-
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normative goals (Tocci 2008: 13). While this is still from the perspective of the foreign policy actor, 
the conditions in which a policy 'unfolds' in the international political system in the respective pol-
icy area is also of importance. Tocci names three levels of analysis which are to be considered on 
this note. Firstly, the interaction of the foreign policy actor with the targeted state/regime must be 
examined. Secondly, the actor's interaction with the policies of other actors in the policy area can 
possibly bear decisive synergetic effects towards the achievement of milieu goals. Thirdly, the 
wider international context has to be taken into account:  
A key determinant of normative foreign policy is the extent to which normative goals are promoted, 
monitored and enforced by international organisations, as well as the degree to which a foreign pol-
icy actor successfully makes use of these organisations to promote its goals. (Tocci 2008: 20) 
To conclude, we note that in order to represent a comprehensive normative foreign policy actor, an 
actor must intentionally correspond to all criteria which are depicted by means of the three variables 
mentioned above. While a foreign policy actor can control the first two internal variables, the for-
eign policy impact remains partly out of reach due to the multiplicity of international actors, their 
interests and the configuration of international organisations in the respective policy areas and pol-
icy regimes. As an example, a foreign policy actor could have formulated normative foreign policy 
goals and employed its available means to achieve these milieu goals, yet it may fail to achieve the 
intended normative foreign policy impact due to the wider international context it is taking place in. 
Nevertheless, apart from merely categorising and characterising a foreign policy actor into one of 
the categories mentioned in the matrix above, it is important to identify under which conditions a 
foreign policy actor is behaving in its particular way. 
2.3. Role theory  
The following chapter depicts a disquisition on sociological role theory, as determined by Elgström 
and Smith et al. in The European Union's Roles in International Politics from 2006. In this collec-
tion of articles, the authors aim to apply sociological role theory on an International Relations level 
of analysis. In the context of this thesis, this chapter aims to provide a theoretical basis for the dis-
cussion on why the EU is acting/behaving in a given way in the selected policy field of non-
proliferation. While the previous theoretical considerations depict the concept of NPE and norma-
tive foreign policy as a whole, the outlining of sociological role theory in this chapter will help to 
discuss that the EU is an inconsistent normative actor in the analytical part of this thesis.  
The initial motivation of the authors to apply role theory to IR refers to the growing amount of aca-
demic literature on the EU and its nature as an international actor, which range between the ex-
tremes of the EU being a potential state on the one end, and the EU being a "[...] patchy and frag-
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mented international participant [...]" with little more than diplomatic coordination on the other 
(Elgström and Smith 2006: 1). These extreme positions and a lot more in between them highlight 
the analytical heterogeneity of defining the EU's actions in the various policy fields that it is en-
gaged in. As the authors note, the EU may exist within gaps in the existing literature which explains 
why the EU remains a "largely unidentified object" (ibid.). 
9
 
While several roles have been attributed to the EU in research (see normative and civilian power 
EU), the authors stress that too often the EU is regarded by means of a comparison with state actors. 
Instead, due to its peculiar institutional arrangement, a unique perspective on the EU must be em-
ployed in order to gain a deeper understanding of its nature. Manners' rationale behind Normative 
Power Europe supports this claim, as explained above. The EU follows, unlike traditional state ac-
tors in the international political system, 'milieu goals' rather than 'possession goals', as the authors 
argue and as will be explained in detail in the following. In short, we note that while possession 
goals refer to national interests, milieu goals refer to the aim of changing the environment in which 
the foreign policy actor operates in.  
Elgström and Smith find that according to Manners, the EU has always accounted for a normative 
basis for its hybrid form of governance, which consists of five core norms from its aquis politique 
and the aquis communitaire: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law as well as the promotion and 
ensuring of human rights. Although normative reasoning behind foreign policy actions are not a 
unique feature of the EU as other states might share and pursue similar goals, the notion that the EU 
has "[...] so far represented something different from states in the international system in that it has 
not been an actor that is only guided by self-interest [...]", stands at the beginning of the reasoning 
behind the concept of Normative Power Europe (Sjursen 2002: 15; quoted in: Elgström and Smith 
2006: 3). Complementary to this, the authors adhere to the idea that 
The normative ambitions of the EU, exemplified by the inclusion of normative conditions in most of 
its international agreements, demonstrate its conscious efforts to shape its environment. (Elgström 
and Smith 2006: 2) 
While these statements are rather vague and do not account for much explanatory power in the con-
text of the normative foreign policies of the EU, we note that an understanding of the EU's policies 
can stem from the study of both, its normative basis and reasoning, as well as its institutions and 
policy instruments, as the EU is unique due to the peculiar configuration of its external policy in-
struments (ibid.). While the mix of international and supranational elements in the EU's foreign 
policy institutions "[...] is usually seen as a problem for constructing and executing a consistent and 
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coherent external policy [...]", the authors argue that their peculiar institutional arrangement can 
also be seen as an advantage and contribute to the EU's distinctiveness. This supports Manners' 
claim that the EU's unique form of hybrid governance is one of the factors that makes the EU nor-
matively different (Elgström and Smith 2006: 4). 
However, given the peculiar nature of the EU's institutional arrangements, how can an incremental 
understanding of the EU's nature and its actions emerge? As the authors argue, sociological role 
theory can be transferred onto and applied on the international political system level of analysis. In 
the following, the reasoning behind this statement will be examined. Firstly, we note that Elgström's 
and Smith's conception of the term 'role' refers to 
[...] patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour. Roles are determined both by an actor's own con-
ceptions about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations, or role prescriptions, of other actors. 
(Elgström and Smith 2006: 5; ref. to: Holsti 1970: 238-239) 
Furthermore, this role conception bears a strong social constructivist notion, as role-taking of an 
actor is not a mechanistic process:  
The roles an actor engages in are in part an effect of learning and socialization in interactive negotia-
tion processes (Aggestam 2004a, b) where self-conceptions are confronted with expectations. 
(Elgström and Smith 2006: 5) 
Accordingly, in the following, roles will be understood in terms of a set of norms and expectations 
which constrain a foreign policy actor's behaviour. 
Given these broad basic theoretical specifications for a theory-building exercise in the volume, 
Aggestam aims to answer a number of questions concerning the EU's actorness in the international 
political system. More specifically, the discussion in her chapter of the volume aims to outline a 
basic theoretical framework which helps to construct a role analysis model applicable to EU foreign 
policies (Aggestam 2006: 11-29). Initially, a short disquisition on sociological role theory will be 
provided. The provision of this aims to help to contextualise its basic tenets in order to integrate 
them into the analytical framework of this thesis. 
As Aggestam points out, the origins of sociological role theory refer to the theatre stage, as the so-
cial or political actor resembles the stage actor. This conception highlights the relationship between 
the individual (actor) and the social structure (stage) it is embedded in. As society serves as the 
stage, the actors wear 'masks' to comply with the role(s) they have learned. If this picture is trans-
lated into a sociological perspective by means of role theory, we note that it aims to discuss how 
human agents and social structures dynamically interrelate in a very fundamental sense (Aggestam 
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2006: 11-12). This is easily translatable to the stage of international politics: foreign policy actors 
employ various roles in the conduct of foreign policy, as will be argued in the following. 
Roles are an emergent property not understandable merely in terms of the qualities of individuals 
alone; they are rather developing out of the interaction with individuals in particular environmental 
settings. The relationship between a role and the actor is mutual: roles and individuals mutually 
influence each other over the course of time. Correspondingly, future generations become influ-
enced by roles employed by earlier generations, as they are socialised by them indirectly through 
their peer groups. Furthermore, "[i]t is because individuals are role-players that their behaviour is 
neither idiosyncratic nor random" (Bradbury et al. 1972: 43; quoted in: Aggestam 2006: 12). 
Role theory was first introduced in foreign policy analysis by Holsti in 1970, who notes that analo-
gous to sociological role theory, a role conception "[...] is a product of a nation's socialisation proc-
ess and influenced by its history, culture and societal characteristics." (Aggestam 2006: 13; ref. to: 
Holsti 1970: 38-39). Holsti's achievement is the derivation of the idea that roles are not "[...] un-
folded from abstract theoretical discussions, but analysed inductively in terms of the roles policy-
makers themselves perceived and defined." (ibid.). The strength of this approach is that it accounts 
for the political reality as it is experienced by policy-makers, "[...] who construct it in a dynamic 
interaction between rules and reason." (Aggestam 2006: 13; ref. to: Searing 1991: 1248). 
It is important for the research of this thesis to stress that policy-makers "[…] express different & 
numerous roles than the general role stipulated deductively by academics [...]", as roles "[...] have 
multiple sources and are not exclusively generated by the institutional distribution of power." (Ag-
gestam 2006: 13). As will be argued in the analytical part of this thesis, various roles of the EU are 
employed when acting in the non-proliferation regimes. While this in itself does not fully refute 
Manners' notion of NPE, it will be reasoned that the conduct of the EU in different roles in the pol-
icy field leads to an inconsistency in its foreign policy actions. Furthermore, foreign policy makers 
are neither wholly free choosing agents, nor do external structures fully determine their actions and 
behaviour: 
Political actors are constituted by their interests, by which they evaluate their anticipations and con-
sequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions. They calculate 
consequences and follow rules, and the relation between the two is often subtle. (March and Olsen 
1998: 12; quoted in: Aggestam 2006: 14) 
The previous discussion has shown that roles of foreign policy actors can be analysed and which are 
influencing and facilitating factors in regard to this. In the following, a further overview of distinc-
tions of the concept of role itself will be given. 
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Role expectations refer to expectations which other actors prescribe and expect on the role-
beholder. In foreign policy, actors constantly express and transmit their expectations towards other 
policy actors. The ongoing institutionalisation of international affairs and the universalised political 
culture generate broad expectations about actors which can set limits to the roles of policy-makers. 
More specifically, "[i]nternational role expectations can be studied as the normative expectations 
that membership in different institutions generate." (Aggestam 2006: 19). Participation in interna-
tional organisations or policy regimes thus goes hand in hand with a set of prescriptions and expec-
tations which influence an actor's role behaviour. The perception of what 'appropriate' role behav-
iour is varies among policy actors over the world and must always be regarded in terms of the inter-
action perspective mentioned above.   
Role conceptions refer to the "[...] normative expectations that the role beholder expresses towards 
itself, i.e. the ego-part's own definition." (Aggestam 2006: 19). A foreign policy actor's own defini-
tion of a role is always connected to a self-set and self-perceived responsibilities and obligations. It 
can best be understood in terms of a mixture of norms, intentions and descriptions of reality, "[...] 
which vary in degree of specificity and manifestation", according to the specific actor (Aggestam 
2006: 20). However, it is unrealistic that an actor would conceive itself in terms of one single role; 
rather, multiple roles are available. There always is an element of role-playing involved in the con-
duct of foreign policies, and due to the multiplicity of employable roles, a foreign policy actor al-
ways has room to manoeuvre between these roles. We note that "[t]he greater the extent to which 
policy-makers are socialised into and internalise these role conceptions, the more stable a role will 
be." (Aggestam 2006: 20). 
Role performance refers to the actual foreign policy behaviour "[...] in terms of characteristic pat-
terns of decisions and actions undertaken in specific situational contexts." (Aggestam 2006: 20). 
This concept is closely linked to the role conception of a foreign policy actor. However, as men-
tioned above, the multiplicity of roles that a foreign policy actor has at its disposal, makes it hard to 
know precisely or forecast which role is selected by the actor in a specific context, and most impor-
tantly, which particular objective is attached to it. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that role 
conceptions do not determine policy outcomes directly. They rather "[...] define the potential range 
of options and strategies." (ibid.) 
Finally, the role set describes a series or a set of roles that are at the same time one role. It refers to 
the total sum of all roles and stands accordingly as a comprehensive term. Within the reach of this 
definition, scholarly concepts like 'Civilian Power Europe', 'Normative Power Europe' or 'Normal 
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Power Europe' can be found. The here depicted theoretical framework of role theory and its con-
nected definitions will be utilised in the analytical chapter of this thesis.  
By means coherent research design which includes relevant selected theoretical tenets from NPE, 
normative foreign policy and role theory, the working hypothesis and the research question of this 
research can be discussed. While these definitions and dedications have been outlined in this chap-
ter, the specific research design and the connected research perspective will precede the analytical 
discussion of this thesis. 
In the following, an overview of available and relevant methodology will be depicted. The selected 
methodology goes hand in hand with the theoretical treatise of this thesis: by means of case study 
methodology and the utilisation of the depicted research framework, the notion of 'Normative 
Power Europe' can be evaluated and challenged. This aims to test the theoretically coined working 
hypothesis. The means of how to test hypotheses and thus theory are widespread in social sciences 
and the specific use of one or several methodological points of view depends very much on the 
setup of the hypotheses and the available data. A very useful overview of available IR-
methodologies is given by Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias et al. (2007), in which case study meth-
ods, quantitative methods as well as formal methods are discussed through three different subfields 
of IR (International Political Economy, International Environmental Politics and International Secu-
rity). The following outline of the methodology of this thesis refers to case study methodology, as 
this mode of analysis is the most suitable one for discussing the research question and the case of 
the EU's non-proliferation policies towards India, as we will see. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
As this thesis takes place within the limits of the discipline of IR, a contextualisation of available 
methodology for conducting research in the discussed case in the policy field of non-proliferation 
will be provided in the following. This does not only help to get an overview of the available re-
search methodology in the discussed case, but it aims to open up a discussion-path which will ap-
proach the specific methodology utilised in this thesis. The methodology provided in the following 
serves the purpose of discussing the research question of this thesis, which again aims to refute 
Manners' theoretical notion of NPE. 
Firstly, a number of necessary basic definitions and a contextualisation of previous findings into 
these definitions will be given, alongside the formulation of the guiding working hypothesis of this 
research, which has already been provided in the introductory chapter. Secondly, the specific meth-
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odology of this thesis will be outlined, referring to the advantages, disadvantages and probable 
shortcomings of the chosen methodological framework.  
The guiding definitions for the terms 'theory' and 'methodology' in this thesis can be found in 
Sprinz' and Wolinsky-Nahmia’s Models, Numbers & Cases - Methods for Studying Internation Re-
lations. For them, theory on the one hand provides  
[...] clear and precise explanations for important phenomena. It focuses scholarly attention on puz-
zles that set the research agenda for students of the field. Ideally, theory should also offer a set of 
testable and falsifiable hypotheses, thus encouraging systematic re-evaluation of its main arguments 
through different research methods. (Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2007: 4) 
According to this, theories do not merely pose dogmas of different IR schools of thinking (such as 
constructivist, realist or institutionalist schools); they are rather tools to explain phenomena in the 
social world. George and Bennett note that 
Highly general and abstract theories [...] which set aside intervening processes and focus on correla-
tions between the "start" and the "finish" of a phenomenon, are far too general to make sharp theo-
retical predictions (George and Bennett 2005: 7).  
This is not only true for IR, but for all disciplines within the Social Sciences. What this means for 
the research design of this thesis, is that the theoretical framework which will enable the analytical 
discussion will be heavily aligned towards the setup of the methodology of this thesis. Methodology 
namely  
[...] refers to systematically structured or codified ways to test theories. Methodology is particularly 
useful in the context of a progressive research program where hypotheses lead themselves to falsifi-
cation. (Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2007: 4) 
While working hypotheses can serve as a starting point of the research, utilising theory in a given 
methodological framework can lead to the falsification of hypotheses. This in turn leads to theory 
advancement. The theoretical statement on the EU being a consistent normative actor, which is sup-
ported by a growing amount of literature in the discipline of IR, will be challenged against the 
background of the EU's selective manner in which it employs the non-proliferation clause. 
3.1. Case study methodology 
Theory advancement often takes place by means of the formulation of new hypotheses, once an 
existing theoretical hypothesis has been falsified: "Besides formal models, it is mainly case study 
research that can generate new hypotheses to advance theory building." (Sprinz and Wolinsky-
Nahmias 2007: 4). In the following, a basic outline of case study methodology will be provided. 
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This will help to proceed with the research plan in the following chapter, which includes all specific 
features of the methodological framework of the thesis. 
As mentioned above, case study analysis poses the central methodological concept of this thesis. 
However, if the targeted theory testing exercise is to succeed, elaboration on which specific mode 
of case study analysis will be conducted is essential. The working definition for a 'case' in this thesis 
refers to 'an instance of a class of events', which can also be seen in terms of a social phenomenon 
of scientific interest. Furthermore we note that,  
A case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for 
analysis, rather than a historical event itself. The Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, is a historical 
instance of many different classes of events: deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis management [...]. 
A researcher's decision about which class of events to study and which theories to use determines 
what data from the Cuban Missile Crisis are relevant to her or his case study of it. (George and Ben-
net 2005: 18) 
For George and Bennett, various modes of case study methods exist: 
[...], we define case study methods to include both within-case analysis of single cases and compari-
sons of a small number of cases, since there is a growing consensus that the strongest means of draw-
ing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case 
comparisons within a single study or research program. (George and Bennett 2005: 18) 
While the specific case selection will take place in chapter 5.2., at this point it is feasible for the 
following elaborations to hint at the overall case, which is the EU's conduct of foreign policies or 
external actions. This case has specifically been selected in order to test Manners' notion of NPE in 
the policy-area of non-proliferation. The specific within-case study, which sets the scope for the 
theory testing will be outlined later on. In the following, an overview of possible pitfalls, limitations 
and shortcomings of case study methodology will be provided. 
First and foremost, we note that case selection bias potentially poses a severe problem, which  
[...] is commonly understood as occurring when some form of selection process is either the design 
of the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation results in inferences that suffer from 
systematic error (George and Bennett 2005: 23)  
Such biases can occur when the cases or subjects are self-selected or when the researcher unwit-
tingly selects cases that represent a truncated sample along the dependent variable of the relevant 
population of cases (ibid.). Furthermore, the selection of the dependent variable (or outcome vari-
able) can possibly preselect causal paths and variables being used in the study and anticipate a re-
search result, thus leaving the actual research without added value. It must be noted that case study 
researchers sometimes deliberately choose cases in cross case comparison that share a particular 
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outcome. As this thesis will comprise a single case study/within case methodology, this pitfall can 
be ignored. (George and Bennett 2005: 24-25).  
Possibly the most dangerous consequence of biased selection could be a research design in which 
only cases whose dependent and independent (input/outcome) variables vary, furthermore ignoring 
cases which appear to contradict the theory. A typical result of this would be following overgener-
alisations from these cases to wider populations (George and Bennett 2005: 23-26). As the research 
focus of this thesis is set onto a single policy area, this danger is a real threat. However, as men-
tioned above, the analysed case study in the selected policy field is seen in terms of one case study 
among other possible ones and findings will therefore only be regarded as valid in the specific cho-
sen policy context. It is crucial to bear in mind that more case studies on varying foreign policy ar-
eas would need to be conducted, if the theoretical notion of NPE was to be refuted to a greater ex-
tent. For the research aim of this thesis, namely to analyse the normative consistency of the EU's 
non-proliferation policy in order to refute Manners' notion of NPE, the chosen research focus is 
sufficient. 
A coherent research design must be depicted in order to avoid these possible pitfalls and shortcom-
ings, which will be provided in the following chapter.  
3.2. Research plan/Designing the case study research  
According to George and Bennett, "[t]here are three phases in the design and implementation of 
theory-oriented case studies." (2005: 73). Firstly, objectives, the design and the structure of the re-
search need to be formulated. Secondly, each case study is carried out according to the design. 
Thirdly, and what concludes, is relying on the findings of the case study in order to assess its con-
tribution to the research objective of the study. While the first phase is specifically discussed in this 
subchapter, the design of phase two and three will take place in the subsequent subchapters of this 
thesis. According to this notion, this chapter prepares the actual conduct of research in the thesis 
and can therefore be seen as conclusive, focusing and summarising remarks towards the specific 
methodology of the thesis. All of the following elaborations draw heavily on the previous content- 
and theory-related findings.  
Within the first phase, five different tasks must be distinguished which are "[...] relevant not only 
for case study methodology but for all types of systematic, theory-oriented research." (George and 
Bennett 2005: 73). If the research design phase is not carried out carefully, "[...] it will be difficult 
to achieve the research objectives of the study" (George and Bennett 2005: 73-74). Thus, complet-
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ing the five tasks mentioned by George and Bennett will help to define an effectual research design 
which will enable the theoretical discussion of the thesis. 
3.2.1. Task one: Specification of the problem and research objective 
The first task refers to the specification of the research problem and the connected research objec-
tive, which are both closely connected. The research objective "[...] constrains and guides decisions 
that will be made regarding the other four tasks." (George and Bennet 2005: 74). More precisely, a 
disquisition of gaps in existing knowledge and the acknowledgement of contradictory theories must 
take place. Furthermore, given evidence (such as data) must hint at inadequacies in the explanatory 
capability of existing theories (ibid.). 
The research objective can be abstracted from the theoretical puzzle that can be found within the 
case of the EU's non-proliferation policies. It is helpful for the research design to refer to the work-
ing hypothesis and the research question as stated above. The research objective is to verify or fal-
sify whether the EU is consistently acting according to its self-set normative foundations and ra-
tionales in the policy domain of non-proliferation. Through targeting this research objective, theory 
testing of the theoretical notion of NPE will take place, as the research of this thesis will challenge 
the notion of the EU as a consistent normative actor. While six types of theory building with vary-
ing research objectives exist, this thesis will focus on 'theory testing' of Manners' NP framework, in 
which "case studies assess the validity and scope conditions of single or competing theories." 
(George and Bennett 2005: 75-76). Case study methodology specifically lends itself in the selected 
topic, as Manners himself utilises case-study methodology to reach his conclusions. 
3.2.2. Task two: Developing a research strategy: specification of variables 
In designing case study methodology, it is helpful to think in terms of independent and dependent 
variables. Dependent variables are outcome variables, they must be seen as more or less fixed vari-
ables that are to be explained or predicted (George and Bennett 2005: 80-81). The specification of 
the research problem or the research objective (see task one) is closely related to the dependent 
variable: The specific dependent variable in the research of the thesis is the consistency of norma-
tive policy-actions of the EU as an actor in the non-proliferation regime. The discussion on the no-
tion of the EU as a normative actor is preceding and thus formulating the outcome variable. 
Independent (or intervening) variables on the other hand are variables discussing the dependent 
variable (George and Bennett 2005: 80-81). In the course of discussing the outcome variable as 
stated above, all of the EU's policy documents and position papers mentioned in chapter two serve 
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as independent variables. They explain the course of development of the EU's capabilities in the 
chosen policy domain, leading to the final notion that the EU is a normative actor per definition. 
The discussion of this takes place on the 'Case: The EU's non-proliferation policies' 
10
 level of 
analysis. (-Independent Variables set 1-) 
The second set of independent variables is the dataset of bilateral mixed agreements between the 
EU and third states that have included or excluded the non-proliferation clause 
11
. The discussion of 
this takes place on the 'Case study/theory development: The EU's non-proliferation policies towards 
India' 
12
 level of analysis.(-Independent Variables set 2-) As the available data suggests, a theory 
building exercise takes place in the analytical chapter of this thesis which dismisses the notion of 
'the EU as a consistent normative actor' and subsequently lead towards the notion of 'the EU not 
fully and consistently acting according to its own normative basis'. The second set of independent 
variables must therefore be regarded in terms of intervening variables which interrupt the chain of 
causality from the first set of independent variables. 
These various lines of variables must be seen in direct connection to the working hypothesis of the 
thesis. While the first set of independent variables supports the hypothesis of the EU as a consistent 
normative actor in the non-proliferation regime, independent variable set 2 leads to the falsification 
of this hypothesis and therefore accounts for theory testing. 
3.2.3. Task three: Case selection 
According to George and Bennett, the third task in designing a case study is the specific selection of 
the case or cases in which the case study will take place (2005: 83). In the case of the research of 
this thesis, this task carries important implications, as it is through the following exercise, that the 
specific research focus can be localised. The overall case is the EU's conduct of foreign relations or 
external actions. The subfield is the EU's non-proliferation policy, in which the case study and thus 
the theory-development can be localised. The case study of the thesis is, as mentioned above, a 
within-case study/single case study of the EU's non-proliferation policy towards India. 
                                                          
10
 As described in chapter 3.2.3. 
11
 The data requirements will be discussed in chapter 3.2.4. 
12
 As described in chapter 3.2.3. 
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Case: The EU as an actor in the international political 
system 
↓     ↓      ↓     ↓     ↓ 
Subcase: The EU's foreign policy actions 
↓     ↓      ↓     ↓     ↓ 
Subcase: The EU's non-proliferation policy 
↓     ↓      ↓     ↓     ↓ 
Case study/theory development: The EU's non-
proliferation policies towards India 
While the selected case of the EU's non-
proliferation policy does not contain a com-
parative dimension in this thesis, the results 
of the theory development exercise in the 
case study can be seen as a test case next to 
other possible cases in the same policy area 
of foreign relations/external actions. 
"Often researchers begin their inquiry with a theory in search of a test case or a case in search of a 
theory for which it is a good test" (George and Bennett 2005: 83). The original interest in the se-
lected case study in the thesis stems from the notion of "the EU as a normative actor". The selection 
of the specific case of the EU's no-proliferation policies has been followed subsequently as to the 
availability of data supporting a constructive theory testing exercise. The selection of available data 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
3.2.4. Task four and five: Describing the variance in variables and the formulation of data 
requirements & general questions 
George and Bennett note that 
[T]he case study method will be more effective if the research design includes a specification of the 
data to be obtained from the case or cases under study. Data requirements should be determined by 
the theoretical framework and the research strategy to be used for achieving the study's research ob-
jectives. (George and Bennett 2005: 86) 
Bearing the research objective of discussing the normative consistency of the EU's non-proliferation 
policy in mind, the two independent variable sets correspond with two datasets, both being part of 
the analysis in the thesis. The first dataset (which corresponds with the first independent variable 
set) will be analysed by means of a disquisition on the institutional development of the EU's foreign 
policy and non-proliferation policy and institutions. The notion of a hypothetical normative consis-
tency of the EU's actions in the non-proliferation regime will stand as the result of this. The second 
independent variable set (which is the intervening variable) accounts for the second dataset, which 
refers to the specific formulation and the inclusion/exclusion of the non-proliferation clause into 
bilateral mixed agreements between the EU and third states. The resulting statistical exercise and 
analysis of simple design will suffice to support the notion of the 'EU not being a consistent norma-
tive actor in the non-proliferation regime', therefore falsifying the working hypothesis of this thesis. 
Both discussions are incrementally linked to the theoretical framework as they pose the theory-
testing exercise, as outlined above.  
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The discussion of the working hypothesis is therefore taking place by means of both, the treaty-
related and institutional development of the EU's non-proliferation capacities, as well as the dataset 
of compliance/non-compliance with self-set standards and norms by means of the inclu-
sion/exclusion of the non-proliferation clause. By following this specific discussion-path, a falsifi-
cation and revoking of the notion of the EU being a normative actor in the non-proliferation regime 
will be stated. On the contrary, a demonstration that the opposite is the case will take place: Fur-
thermore, this aims to highlight the need of further research on the EU's normative qualities in dif-
ferent policy areas. 
4. BACKGROUND: THE EU'S ACTORNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 
The following depiction of the EU as an actor in the international non-proliferation regime  takes 
place in terms of a sequentially organised discussion. In doing so, the 'actorness' of the EU itself 
will be examined in greater detail by means the following steps: 
Sequence 
Actor (EU)  
 
 
→ 
Actors' tools for 
implementing poli-
cies  
→ 
Policy (exporting 
norms/non-
proliferation)  
→ 
Outcome of policy  
 
 
→ 
Evaluation 
 
This chapter comprises the background and context for the actual discussion of the research ques-
tion. Accordingly, the first three items from the sequence above will be discussed in chapter 4.. The 
outcome of the policy as well as the evaluation will follow in chapter 5., which contains the analysis 
and theory development exercise of this thesis. 
In order to analyse the specific 'actorness' and the track record of the EU in the policy field of non-
proliferation, the various international non-proliferation regime(s) 
13
 will be depicted in greater de-
tail. This is necessary in order to provide a contextualisation of the foreign policy actor (the EU) 
into the wider frame of non-proliferation policy.  
After this contextualisation of the non-proliferation regimes surrounding the actor (the EU) and the 
case study, the actor itself will be classified and positioned within the outlined case-categories men-
tioned in the methodological chapter on case selection. Accordingly, a positioning of the EU as an 
actor in the international political system, as well as subsequently outlining the subordinated case of 
                                                          
13
 On an initial note, it is sensible to speak in terms of regimes (plural form), as various treaties are depicted in this the-
sis. However, the singular formulation will also be employed in the following: It refers to the overall regime against the 
proliferation of WMD in terms of an inclusive conception. This will further be explained in chapter 4.1.5. 
32 
 
the EU's foreign policy will take place. The 'actorness' of the EU on these two levels of analysis 
carries implications for implementing policies in both, the international political system, as well as 
more specifically in the non-proliferation regimes, which will each be highlighted. A disquisition on 
the development of the EU's institutional setup concerning foreign policies in general, as well as its 
non-proliferation policy will be provided. The outlining of these is heavily aligned towards the 
theoretical discussion of the thesis and aims at 'setting the stage' for the discussion of the working 
hypothesis and the research question in chapter 5.. A deep understanding of the outcomes of EU 
policy can only emerge if all relevant parts are discussed and put into the appropriate context. 
This outlining will additionally serve as a rapprochement towards the selected case study of this 
thesis. The discussion of the case study takes place in chapter 5.: the outcome of the EU's policies in 
non-proliferation will be discussed by means of a more general discussion on the specific formula-
tion and the inclusion/exclusion of the non-proliferation clause in mixed agreements on the one 
hand, as well as by means of the specific case study of the EU's non-proliferation policies towards 
India on the other hand. This discussion, which stands for the last part of the sequence, includes an 
evaluation of these findings. 
4.1. The international non-proliferation regimes of Weapons of Mass Destruction  
The international non-proliferation regimes of Weapons of Mass Destruction developed in accor-
dance to the grave dangers posed by new weapon technologies. In the following chapter, a working 
definition for the concept of 'regime' and scholarly views on the international non-proliferation re-
gimes itself will be given. Furthermore, an overview of the existing international non-proliferation 
framework will be provided, which consists of a series of multilateral agreements and treaties on the 
various kinds of WMD, namely CBRN weapons and the related material for their production. More 
specifically, in the following subchapters, four distinct treaties of crucial importance for the overall 
non-proliferation regime will be discussed: the NPT, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as well as the The Hague Code of Conduct Against Bal-
listic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). 
14
 In order to set these multilateral treaties into an appropriate 
perspective for the theoretical discussion of this thesis, normative foundations of the various com-
ponents of the international non-proliferation regime will be highlighted and emphasised. 
In order to gain a full understanding of what these multilateral efforts are directed against, a number 
of initial considerations on various subject matters must be made in this chapter. Firstly, the concept 
                                                          
14
 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will not be taken into the consideration in the research as it has not 
been ratified by eight states, under which the U.S.A., a notable stakeholder of WMD, can be found. 
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of 'regime' must be elaborated in order to point out that non-proliferation efforts in the international 
political system are not of short-time nature. Secondly, the concept of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion and their implications for the non-proliferation regime and the research focus of this thesis will 
be elaborated. These elaborations pose the background for the discussion of the multilateral agree-
ments that form the non-proliferation regime. 
The regime-concept in its widely applicable basic definition refers to a set of implicit or explicit 
"principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations con-
verge in a given issue-area." (Krasner 1983; quoted in: Smith 1987: 253). Furthermore, 
[p]rinciples are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in 
terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. (Krasner 
1983:2; quoted in: Smith 1987: 256) 
 
While this basic definition is applicable to various policy areas, Smith points out that a regime in 
the area of security-policy carries special features due to the competing nature of security concerns 
of different states. Furthermore, a simple short-term agreement can also bear the characteristics 
mentioned above, while a regime's emphasis lies on longevity and sustainability. A regime in the 
security policy area is characterised by the  
[…] infusion of behaviour with principles and norms that distinguishes regime governed activity in 
the international system from more conventional activity guided exclusively by narrow calculations 
of interest. (ibid.) 
While regimes are flexible and ever-evolving entities, during the course of their development they 
still crucially depend on their normative underpinnings. 
15
 
For the sake of the research of this thesis, this notion of the concept of 'regime' must be regarded in 
connection to normative foreign policy goals, as explained in chapter 2.2.. A regime in the security 
policy area such as the international non-proliferation regime defies narrowly state-defined posses-
sion goals. Instead, due to the long term setup of the regimes, their goals must be regarded in terms 
of milieu goals as exemplified in chapter 2.2.. A foreign policy actor participating in an institution-
alised regime necessarily aims to reach the milieu goals agreed upon within the limits of the regime. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that this view is by no means complete. Firstly, it is very 
likely that actors may try to join a given regime in order to undermine the regime's performance in 
order to achieve own possession goals. Secondly, leverage on deciding which milieu goals are to be 
achieved within any given regime is distributed unevenly to the various actors performing within 
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 "If these basic norms and principles should change, then the regime no longer exists" (Smith 1987: 257) 
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the regime. Accordingly, any institutionalised form of international regimes should be regarded in 
terms of a dialogue between states' possession goals and their normatively coined milieu goals. 
These considerations carry a number of important implications for the non-proliferation regimes of 
WMD. First and foremost, the normative underpinnings of a specific regime must be highlighted, as 
this stays relevant during the course of the regime's development, due to the longevity of milieu 
goals which they get translated into. This differs, for example, from short term possession goals, 
which constantly change depending on the political, social and cultural discourse within a given 
state. A regime's basic rationale namely refers to various non-proliferation mechanisms, such as the 
stop of further proliferation or disarmament and reliance on different organisations, institutions, 
verification mechanisms and/or sanctions. The performance of various parts of the overall non-
proliferation regime obviously depends on the initial setup of its sub-regimes, their development 
ever since as well as the support of the engaged member states. 
An understanding of non-proliferation in terms of merely putting a halt to the spreading of WMD is 
problematic. As Brzoska points out, this specific view on non-proliferation is the one of the domi-
nating state powers in the non-proliferation regime, namely the states having the according WMD at 
their disposal. A second and differing understanding of non-proliferation refers a comprehensive 
disarmament of WMD of all participating actors in the regime. This notion is mainly carried out in 
countries within the non-proliferation regime which do not account for these weapons, and which 
thus do not have the necessary political and/or economic leverage to enforce their understanding of 
non-proliferation (Brzoska 1992: 217). Varying understandings of non-proliferation exist within the 
non-proliferation regime, which by definition would have to be based on a unified normative foun-
dation. This leads to Brzoska's convincing main criticism on the debate on unifying normative un-
derpinnings of the international non-proliferation regime of WMD 
16
, namely that these diverging 
views and positions of actors in the regime contradict the very same notion (1992: 216-217).  
According to this lack of a shared comprehensive normative underpinning of the overall regime of 
non-proliferation of WMD, we note that the research of this thesis must employ a specifically self-
selected perspective on the non-proliferation regime. While the discrepancy in the conception of the 
non-proliferation regime of various actors is apparent, the perspective employed here focuses on the 
EU as an actor in the non-proliferation regime. The research question dictates this focus as it re-
volves around the EU's normative actions in the policy area of non-proliferation. Accordingly, in 
order to analyse these, the EU's conception of the non-proliferation regime must be employed in 
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this thesis. This perspective has not been chosen in order to support any one assessment or evalua-
tion of the arrangement of the non-proliferation regime; the research focus of this thesis simply dic-
tates the employed perspective. 
Furthermore, discussions on the non-proliferation regimes take place on two different levels of 
analysis, namely the unit and the structural level. Motivations for an actor to engage itself in prolif-
eration or non-proliferation and the formation of the normative underpinnings for these motivations 
take place on both, the level of domestic politics, as well as the level of international politics: 
Domestic determinants of proliferation range broadly and include national prestige, civil-military re-
lations, economic costs and technological capacity, and leadership psychology and attitudes towards 
international norms. The international or structural level of analysis focuses on the determined effort 
by states to ensure their security […]. (Litwak 2003/2004: 7) 
As to the specifications of WMD, it is widely agreed on that these include weapons based on 
chemical & biological agents, as well as nuclear and radiological material (Scruton 2007: 730-731). 
17
 However, it is at least arguable whether chemical and biological weapons should be considered as 
WMD or not, as Cirincione et al. point out: 
Chemical weapons are easy to manufacture, but they inflict relatively limited damage over small ar-
eas and dissipate fairly quickly. Biological weapons agents can be made in most medical laborato-
ries, but it is very difficult to turn these agents into effective weapons, and prompt inoculation and 
quarantine could limit the number of victims and the number of victims and the area affected. Nu-
clear weapons are difficult to produce, but one weapon can destroy an entire city, killing hundreds of 
thousands instantly and leaving lingering radiation that would render large areas uninhabitable for 
years. (Cirincione et al. 2005: 4) 
While such notions on the actual effectiveness of CBRN weapons must obviously be considered for 
policy-making, the research conducted in this thesis will follow an inclusive approach. As will be 
discussed in the following, all non-proliferation actions and initiatives rest on the normative reason-
ing that CBRN weapons cause unimaginable suffering among warring factions, making no differ-
ence between combatants and civilians, thus breaking a number of universal conventions of interna-
tional law. This is furthermore the indirect foundation of the EU's non-proliferations policies and 
actions, which will be discussed in following chapter of chapter 4. and the case study of this thesis. 
The explanations in this chapter take place on the 'The international political system' level of analy-
sis and serve as a contextualisation for the subsequent actor-based discussion on the EU.  
The selection of the discussed treaties and their specifications in the following subchapters draw 
heavily on Hertwig's comprehensive volume on the EU and the fight against proliferation of Weap-
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 "WMD: Idiom […], to denote weapons that will seriously disable a country by killing large numbers of its citizens or 
destroying vital infrastructure. WMD refer both to nuclear weapons, and to other forms of destructive ordinance, such 
as chemical agents and biological weapons, which can destroy whole populations […]." (Scruton 2007: 730-731) 
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ons of Mass Destruction (Hertwig 2009). Her precise depiction of the development of the various 
parts of the international non-proliferation treaties and institutions takes place from an 'international 
law point of view' and will be presented largely unaltered in this chapter, as it accounts for no 
judgemental or normative statements itself. This neutral display will subsequently serve as a fertile 
ground for the discussion on normativity and the EU's non-proliferation policies actions within the 
theoretical discussion of this thesis. It can furthermore be regarded as an external reference point, 
against which the EU's non-proliferation actions will be discussed. 
4.1.1. The NPT 
While the NPT is not the first multilateral treaty against the proliferation of WMD, it has neverthe-
less gained an abundance of scholarly attention due to its prominent role during the Cold War and 
the incredibly destructive force of the subject matter it is dealing with. The NPT is the result of a 
combined effort of 18 countries 
18
 to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons in the late 1960s, which 
led to the transmission of a treaty draft to the General Assembly of the UN in 1968. The NPT was 
eventually ratified in 1970; in the year 2009, 190 states had signed it, which gives it universal valid-
ity in terms of international law (Hertwig 2009: 29). The most noteworthy states outside the NPT-
framework are India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. 
The main goal of the NPT is the reduction of the likeliness of the outbreak of an armed conflict in-
volving nuclear weapons and thus (a) nuclear war. It aims to achieve this goal by means of, as the 
name suggests, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the centre of these efforts stands the 
prevention of a spread of technology and material, which can be utilised for nuclear weapons pro-
grammes towards additional states (horizontal non-proliferation). Furthermore, the NPT aims to 
promote nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Preamble NPT; Art. 6 NPT; 
ref.: Hertwig 2009: 29, Smith 1987: 256-257). 
The NPT obligates all nuclear powers 
19
 not to pass on nuclear weapons or the power of their dis-
posal to any other state (Smith 1987: 27). On the same note does the NPT forbid the transfer of 
technology or knowledge on how to produce nuclear weapons. The definition of a nuclear weapon 
refers to all explosive weapons that rely on the principle of nuclear fission for military purposes 
(Hertwig 2009: 30). Additionally, 'vertical disarmament', which is the dissembling of large numbers 
of the vast stockpile of US-American and Russian nuclear weapons, is set as a goal of the NPT. It is 
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 Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, 
the USSR, the USA, the UAE and GB (Hertwig 2009: 29; footnote 121) 
19
 Nuclear powers in the NPT are all states that gained nuclear weapon capabilities and successfully induced an explo-
sion based on nuclear fission before 1.1.1967. These states are: China, the USSR (now the Russian Federation), the 
USA as well as France and GB (Art. 9, Fig. 3 NPT) 
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noteworthy that all official nuclear powers (legitimised through the NPT-regime) are permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The NPT came into being due to pres-
sure imposed by the two superpowers of the Cold War on other international actors (Müller 1999: 
32). 
In regard to the use of nuclear energy, several regulations can be found within the NPT. Most note-
worthy is the fact that the NPT grants all contracting states the right to develop, produce and use 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as long as these states do not break with the treaty require-
ments mentioned above. This implies that a state whose intention about the use of a nuclear energy 
programme is unclear, may forfeit its right to use it. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), which has been established in 1957, is entitled to safeguard and control the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy by means of Article 3 of the NPT. The IAEA is an autonomous institution which is 
directly linked to the UN General Assembly and regards itself as an "independent international or-
ganization related to the United Nations system" (ref.: Hertwig 2009: 35). The IAEA's ruling body 
is the 'Board of Governors', which consists of changing representatives from 35 NPT signatory 
states at whose top the Director General stands. The Board of Governors reports directly to the UN 
General Assembly, given the case that a state is not complying with NPT and/or IAEA standards of 
safeguarding nuclear material or actually proliferating nuclear material outside of the NPT/IAEA 
safeguard framework. These reports can lead to UN resolutions sanctioning non-compliant states. 
Additional to UN-based resolutions, we note that the IAEA has a list of additional measures at hand 
(see Hertwig 2009: 37). 
In order to adapt the NPT to new challenges in non-proliferation, several review conferences have 
been held, with mixed results (Müller 2005, Katsioulis and Mölling 2010). One of the more recent 
trends in national security strategies of nuclear powers leads towards a modernisation of their nu-
clear arsenals. While reducing the absolute number of nuclear warheads in their reserves, the overall 
number of deployable warheads has stayed remarkably stable. Modernised nuclear weapons have a 
wider range of applicability, such as bunker busting bombs with small nuclear warheads show 
(Hertwig 2009: 33, Schaper 2008: 92).  
While the NPT is the most prominently discussed treaty when it comes to non-proliferation of nu-
clear weapons, it does not contain any specifications against the use of nuclear weapons. Although 
there exists an ongoing discussion in humanitarian international law on whether states are allowed 
to use nuclear weapons in certain special cases (such as self-defence), the practical impossibility of 
using nuclear weapons in an armed conflict without setting the world on fire (and subsequently in-
volve civilians and neutral states) must to be noted. Some limitations on the use of nuclear weapons 
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nevertheless exist outside the NPT-regime in form of a series of treaties against the deployment of 
WMD, such as the Antarctic Treaty from 1959, the Outer Space Treaty from 1967 and the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco from 1967 (Smith 1987: 257). 
All of these designations follow the rationale of the erection of a normatively coined non-
proliferation regime against nuclear weapons. According to Smith, the regime's guiding principle is 
the presumption that  
[…] the spread of nuclear weapons into many hands would further jeopardize prospects for interna-
tional peace and security. […] Consequently the appropriate behavior for nuclear-armed states is not 
to assist others in attaining a similar capacity, and for states without a nuclear armory to forego ac-
quiring one. (Smith 1987: 257) 
These considerations have directly been translated into specific norms that got manifest in a series 
of multilateral treaties, or as Smith labels them, two sets of institutions, the first being treaties on 
geographical boundaries on nuclear weapon use (as mentioned above), the second being the NPT. 
As will be shown in the subsequent discussions on the various non-proliferation treaties, a similar 
normative rationale is not only true for nuclear weapons, but also for their biological and chemical 
counterparts.  
4.1.2 The BWC 
Efforts to set out a comprehensive treaty on the non-proliferation of biological weapons date back 
as far as 1925 when the Geneva Protocol 
20
 was signed. The Geneva Protocol condemns the "use in 
war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices" 
(Geneva Protocol to the Hague Convention 1925). While the implications from the Geneva Protocol 
are still valid and entered the status of customary international law, it is by no means comprehen-
sive in nature (Baxter and Buergenthal 1970: 853-854). Due to two respects, it took until the 1970s 
until a further effort in non-proliferation against biological weapons was made from the side of the 
USA. Firstly, the East-West divide of the Cold War made it impossible for the erection of an effec-
tive non-proliferation regime of biological weapons. Secondly and more importantly, biological 
weapons played no significant role in military strategies since the end of World War II and thus did 
not stand at the forefront of attention of discussions in international law (Hertwig 2009: 50-51). 
Only after the end of the Cold War, a new series of multilateral efforts brought a more comprehen-
sive non-proliferation effort against biological weapons on its way. 
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 "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare" 
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The "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacterio-
logical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction" (or Biological Weapons Conven-
tion: BWC) was presented in 1972 and effectively came into force in 1975. By 2009, 163 states had 
ratified it (Hertwig 2009: 51). According to the BWC's preamble, a general and exhaustive disar-
mament of biological weapons stands in the centre of the treaty. Figure 8 of the preamble further-
more aims to fully exclude the possibility of utilising biological agents and toxins for military pur-
poses (Hertwig 2009: 51).  
However, this part of the BWC is of contestable nature. Practically all biological agents account for 
a 'dual-use character', meaning that practically the full set of knowledge needed for biological 
weapons programmes is also needed for civilian research in medicine or biology. Every pharmaceu-
tical research laboratory could possibly produce the biological agents needed for a weapons pro-
gramme, merely depending on the intention of the researcher(s). Additionally, the distinction be-
tween biological agents produced for civilian research programmes, and the ones for their military 
counterpart cannot be made. It is due to these specific features of the nature of the proliferation of 
biological weapons, that no verification system is supervising non-proliferation efforts (Hertwig 
2009: 51). 
The BWC, similarly to the NPT, initially did not specifically prohibit the use of biological weapons. 
It does however refer directly to the Geneva Protocol (Article 8 BWC), stating that all obligations 
and duties form the Geneva Protocol are to be perpetuated. Even more, the BWC review conference 
from 2006, 
[...] reaffirms that the use by the State Parties, in any way and under any circumstances, of microbial 
or biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I. (BWC Review Conference 2006; ref. in: Hertwig 
2009: 52) 
Article 1 contains the notion of never developing, producing or storing microbial agents or toxins 
that could possibly be utilised in non-peaceful ways. Article 3 refers to the prohibits the transfer of 
biological weapons or agents needed for the development and/or production of these (with or with-
out payment). Furthermore does article 2 Figure 1 of the BWC obligate all signatory states to de-
stroy all agents that have been produced for weapon-usage nine months after signing the treaty at 
the latest.  
However, accountability is the key weakness of the BWC: unlike the NPT, the BWC does not have 
a verification organisation such as the IAEA at its disposal. While the destruction of biological 
weapons is legally binding through the treaty, no supranational organisation exists to supervise this 
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process (Hertwig 2009: 53). The lack of a verification system within the limits of the BWC is yet to 
be overcome. Instead, so-called 'confidence-building measures' are supposed to take place, which 
are mentioned in article 5 of the BWC, and which obligate the signatory states to submit annual 
reports on the state of affairs in biological research, civilian research- and production facilities as 
well as national security programmes against biological weapons. However, not all participating 
states have forwarded these reports (less than one third actually take part in the measures). The re-
ports which were actually forwarded have often been incomplete and/or incorrect (Hertwig 2009: 
57-59). 
4.1.3. The CWC  
The CWC has been signed in 1993 and effectively came into force in 1997, being the result of pro-
longed multilateral negotiations over the course of twenty years. The treaty prohibits the develop-
ment, production, storing and use of chemical weapons, which are weapons which are predomi-
nantly based on toxic qualities of synthetic compounds (Krause 1998: 22; ref. in: Hertwig 2009: 66-
67). In the year 2009, 188 states have signed the CWC, marking its universality under international 
law (Hertwig 2009: 67). Central to the treaty is, apart from the assignations mentioned above, also a 
full disarmament of chemical weapons of all signatory states (Preamble CWC). The treaty further-
more notes that all signatory states agree to comply with the criteria on non-proliferation of chemi-
cal weapons mentioned in the Geneva Protocol from 1925. 
In order to achieve these high aspirations, an effective verification system surveying the disarma-
ment and non-proliferation of chemical weapons has been established alongside the treaty. The 'Or-
ganisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' (OPCW) surveys all civilian and military 
chemical production and research facilities in order to achieve the impossibility of the use of 
chemical weapons in the future (Hertwig 2009: 74-75). Similarly to the IAEO, the OPCW is an 
autonomous organisation associated to the UN. 
All signatory states are obliged to hand in a comprehensive report concerning existent materials 
relevant to the production of chemical weapons within thirty days after the signing of the treaty 
(Hertwig 2009: 69). While the treaty also carries the notion of an obligation of all member states to 
immediately set an end to producing chemical weapons and destroying all stockpiles of already 
produced weapons within ten years after signing the treaty, the sheer amount of existing chemical 
weapons in a number of countries poses an obstacle to achieving this goal. Especially the Russian 
Federation and the U.S.A. have to be mentioned on this note, who account for 40.000 respectively 
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13.500 tons of the worldwide stockpile of 70.000 existing tons of chemical weapons (Hertwig 2009: 
68-69). 
The matter of the delay in destroying chemical weapons stockpiles has been addressed in two re-
view conferences of the CWC in 2001 and 2008. However, the controversy revolving around this 
remains unresolved, as the political statement of the conferences indicates. On the one hand, it fur-
ther underlines the importance of fulfilling the requirements of the CWC and it renews the obliga-
tions of all member states to actively engage in non-proliferation and the destruction of all existing 
stockpiles. On the other hand, the delaying countries have not been rebuked officially (Hertwig 
2009: 70-72). Additionally, much needed reforms within the CWC regime have not taken place as 
Meier points out: not only have new chemical agents not been addressed and included within the list 
of prohibited chemical agents, but also are modern, highly flexible production facilities not super-
vised as thoroughly as 'classic' facilities (Meier 2008: 174; ref. in: Hertwig 2009: 72). 
4.1.4 The HCoC 
The HCoC dates back to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which started off in 
1987 by a G7-led initiative. It was planned to contain harsh export control mechanisms which fore-
saw widespread cooperation of the MTCR member states against the proliferation of ballistic mis-
siles. As the export control tools of the MTCR were considered insufficient, a series of meetings of 
MTCR member states officials led to the ratification of the HCoC by 93 member states in 2002, a 
number which has increased to 130 member states in 2009 (Hertwig 2009: 84). The executive secre-
tariat of the HCoC can be found in Vienna, Austria, within the premises of the Austrian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The HCoC is considered to be potentially the strongest normative multilateral ef-
fort in controlling the international proliferation of ballistic missiles. Its effects however are not 
tangible, yet, due to the absence of states crucial to the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles such as 
India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel and North Korea, which all have ballistic missile capabilities at their 
disposal (Hertwig 2009: 84-85). Also has the threat of proliferation towards non-state actors not 
been addressed at all by the HCoC (Hertwig 2009: 89). 
It is noteworthy that the HCoC is not UN-based due to its strictly multilateral nature, additionally is 
the included 'codex of political nature' not legally binding. However, in order to establish bonds 
between the HCoC and the UN in order to strengthen its effects, a UN-resolution acknowledging 
the efforts and the importance of the work of the HCoC was ratified in various general assembly 
meetings of the UN. The resolution further invites "[…] all states that have not yet subscribed to the 
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Code of Conduct to do so" (UN 2011: 2). The HCoC ultimately aims to achieve universality under 
international law.  
The HCoC carries a number of important implications which are all of inherently normative nature. 
Firstly do all ratifying states agree on working actively against the proliferation on their own as well 
as cooperating internationally to pursue the same goal (HCoC: Figure 2, pos. a). Secondly, it states 
that participation in the HCoC is voluntary and generally open for all states to join (Figure 2, pos. 
d). Thirdly, all ratifying states maintain the freedom of utilising space for peaceful purposes, as long 
as cooperation in this field does not lead to proliferation of ballistic missiles internationally (Figure 
2, pos. f). This also carries the implication that space programmes must not be used to conceal pro-
grammes for ballistic missiles (Figure 2, pos. g). Last but not least, states agree on the need for cre-
ating more transparency in ballistic missile programmes, as well as increasing international coop-
eration and trust in order to foster non-proliferation of ballistic missile technology (Figure 2, pos. h) 
(Hertwig 2009: 85). 
While the HCoC is not directed against the possession of missile technology, it is rather defined to 
function as a tool against the further spread of such technology by means of multilateral efforts. 
Thränert furthermore points out that transparency and accountability of states that have ballistic 
missile technology at their command stands in the centre of the HCoC (2005: 27, referred to by: 
Hertwig 2009: 86).  
As to the specifications of ballistic missiles, a number of considerations are noteworthy. Without 
the according modes of deployment, a WMD is rendered useless as it cannot be targeted properly, 
neither does it function as a deterrent. While this is at least true for state actors, the same does not 
necessarily apply to non-state actors such as terrorist or paramilitary organisations. Due to the com-
pactness of a nuclear bomb (especially a 'dirty bomb' 
21
), an abdication of technologically advanced 
deployment systems is possible: it could simply be smuggled into a harbour or some other place in 
the enemy territory (Beaton 1968: 37). Nowadays, ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), 
SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles) launched from nuclear-powered submarines and 
bombing planes with stealth technology form the peak level of technological development. These 
weapons have a worldwide reach and function as a deterrent in a classic militarily coined thinking 
of security. We note that an estimated 95% of this high-level technology is only available to the 
militarily most powerful and technologically advanced states on the planet (Van Crefeld 2006: 21). 
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 A "dirty bomb" is no nuclear bomb per definition, as it does not rely on nuclear fission. Rather, a regular explosive is 
spreading radioactive particles of non-enriched uranium over a large area. The effect of this would render the affected 
area uninhabitable and would account for large economic damage.  
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4.1.5. Conclusions 
The previous deliberations were made in order to achieve a number of objectives for the following 
analysis of the EU as a non-proliferation actor. Firstly, a multilateral and supranational non-
proliferation framework, which is directed against all kinds of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as 
well as against research on these and their modes of their deployment exist in the form of various 
treaties. As the previous chapters have shown, these treaties are effective to varying extents, each 
dependent on the participating actors' will to engage themselves in them. Secondly, the sum of these 
treaties can be regarded in terms of one overarching non-proliferation regime: while it is true that 
the treaties have been realised through different means and with a varying degree of participation, 
they still account for a very similar initial normative reasoning, namely the key-notion that WMD of 
any kind are inhumane weapons which must be banned from the surface of this planet. This notion 
can be regarded the currently most prominent and best-organised milieu goal of the international 
community in terms of non-proliferation.  
Furthermore, this chapter has shown that non-proliferation actions and policies per se are normative 
by nature, as norms "[...] are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations", 
which is precisely what treaties discussed aim to achieve (Krasner 1983:2; quoted in: Smith 1987: 
256). Accordingly, it is feasible to analyse actors in regard to their consistency and adherence to 
self-set norms in this policy field, and how this affects actors' foreign policy actions and behaviour. 
In the following, a disquisition on the EU as a foreign policy actor and as a non-proliferation actor 
will be depicted. The author of this thesis deems it important to lay open the various developmental 
steps of the EU towards the status quo as only by attaining this knowledge, a deeper running under-
standing of the normative rationales discussed in this thesis can emerge. 
4.2. The EU as a foreign policy actor in the international political system 
The following subchapter aims to show how the EU's contemporary foreign policy structures came 
into being. A framework based on the institutional development of the EU in matters of foreign, 
security and defence policy and the relevant institutional actors in regard to non-proliferation will 
stand as the result of the following chapter. This does not only pose a mere contextualisation of the 
EU's internal structure. Even more, it will help to further narrow down the theoretical focus onto the 
discussed case study in the following analysis. On this note, this chapter goes hand in hand with the 
outlining of the theoretical and methodological setup of the thesis as depicted in chapters 2. and 3.. 
We note that the discussions of this chapter must be located within the 'Case: The EU as an actor in 
the international political system' level of analysis. 
44 
 
Starting as early as 1951, European integration can be regarded in terms of a long political process 
with changing objectives during its course of development. Initially running under the label of the 
'European Coal and Steel Community' (ECSC), Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands aimed at approximating and interlinking war-relevant economic sectors. In 1957, 
the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EC), which led to a more in-
tegrated common market in terms of the liquidation of tariff barriers within the EC, and the erection 
of a common external tariff and a common market for goods, services, capital and labour. Also 
within the reach of the Treaty of Rome, the European Commission (Commission), the Council of 
Ministers, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Common Assembly were introduced. Ini-
tially, the listed actors performed various steering actions in terms of the policy areas covered by 
the Treaty of Rome, leading to a supranational character of the early EC with binding decisions for 
the member states (Van Oudenaren 2010: 16). 
However, policy actions in the domains covered by the Treaty of Rome were solely oriented in-
wards, not reaching out to foreign and defence policies, which were rather dealt with by means of 
bilateral agreements (intergovernmentalism) or within other organisations, such as the NATO. The 
absence of the foreign and defence policy-formulations form the side of the EC was only breached 
due to its role as an economic entity, such as in the negotiations in the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT): 
Matters of "high politics", however, and security and defense policy in particular remained off limits 
to the EC, as the member states had no interest in diluting their sovereignty in this politically sensi-
tive area or in weakening NATO, which was seen as Western Europe's ultimate guarantee against the 
Soviet threat. (Van Oudenaren 2010: 17)   
This inwardly oriented notion of political action first changed notably with the erection of the Euro-
pean Political Cooperaction (EPC), which was agreed upon by the leaders of the EC-states at the 
December 1969 Hague summit which posed as a basis for the member states "[...] to consult on 
questions of foreign policy and, where possible, take common actions with regard to international 
issues." (Van Oudenaren 2010: 18; Hertwig 2009: 5). Subsequently, the EC consistently built up a 
foreign policy profile. This got notably enhanced through the establishment of the European Coun-
cil in Paris in 1974, which was meant to be a meeting ground for the leaders and governments of the 
member states on which common policy guidelines on internal as well as on external issues con-
cerning the EC as a whole could be agreed upon. Nevertheless did foreign policy cooperation stay 
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intergovernmental, as examples of varying foreign policy positions of member states from various 
historical examples show 
22
 (ibid.). 
In the 1980s, the growing enlargement agenda of the EC towards the Mediterranean did not only 
serve as a stabilising measure on the European continent, but even more prepared the EC for pro-
jecting its influence elsewhere - namely towards the East once the Cold War was over (Van Oude-
naren 2010: 18). In 1986, the EC-wide ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) did not only 
create a single market, but also led towards foreign policy cooperation being an obligatory rather 
than a voluntary act. First EC-based agreements under international law took place subsequent to 
the ratification of the SEA (Van Oudenaren  2010: 19, Article 1: clause 1 and 3, Article 3: clause 2, 
Article 30 SEA). The reactivation of the Western European Union (WEU) in the 1980s on the ini-
tiative of François Mitterrand is noteworthy in regard to security and defence policy, as it func-
tioned as an additional meeting ground for foreign ministers and defence ministers on a regular ba-
sis (twice a year). Already in 1987, the seven member states of the WEU had integrated their strate-
gic planning capacities to such an extent that military operations could be coordinated sufficiently 
(Van Oudenaren 2010: 19). In 1992, the WEU adopted the Petersberg tasks, which were designed in 
order to deal with a possibly destabilised Europe in the transition period after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. These included humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and crisis management tasks (WEU 
1992). 
While seemingly becoming a more and more integrated foreign policy actor towards the end of the 
1980s, the rapid and cataclysmic developments of the years 1989 and 1990 took the EC fully by 
surprise. While fear was widespread that the process of European integration would come to a halt 
with the reunification of Germany in 1990, German chancellor Helmut Kohl and French president 
François Mitterrand quickly reassured to strive for a stronger political union in Europe. This notion 
led towards a series of intergovernmental conferences (IGC) at which end-result the Treaty of 
Maastricht stood, also known as the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (Van Oudenaren 2010: 
20-22). 
Through the specifications of the TEU, the EU was formally based on a three-pillar structure. In 
regard to foreign policy actions, the second pillar of the EU is most noteworthy. It included the 
former EPC, which was renamed into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and which 
experienced a credible enhancement on common positions in foreign policies,  
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[...] which included safeguarding the fundamental values and interests of the EU, strengthening the 
security of the EU and its member states, and promoting international cooperation and democracy 
and human rights. (Van Oudenaren 2010: 23) 
Even more did the TEU specify that the CFSP "[...] shall include all questions related to the security 
of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead 
to a common defense." (TEU: Article J.4; quoted in: Van Oudenaren 2010: 23).  
In these early days of the EU after Maastricht, the most pressing foreign policy issue was the yet 
unresolved future development of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European countries which 
had previously been under influence of Soviet Russia. On the medium-term, many of these coun-
tries were given a real existing perspective of joining the EU, in case they fulfilled the so-called 
Copenhagen Criteria, which resulted from a session of the European Council in Copenhagen in 
1993 and which prescribe a set of criteria concerning economic and political standards which corre-
spond widely to EU-standards (Van Oudenaren 2010: 23). However, as the case of former Yugosla-
via shows, the EU was clearly not prepared for active crisis management including coordinated and 
organised military action. Experiencing 'ethnic cleansings' in its direct neighbourhood and being 
displayed as a poor performer of security on the European continent in the international arena led 
towards a series of further EU-treaties that aimed to enhance the performance-capabilities of the 
CFSP framework.  
This led to a new series of treaties, such as the Treaty of Amsterdam in from 1997, the 'Declaration 
on European Defense' resulting from a meeting between Chirac and Tony Blair in Saint Malo in 
1998 and the Treaty of Nice in 2001. As Van Oudenaren points out, these treaties from the end of 
the 1990s mark the beginning of a "new round in its seemingly permanent quest for institutional 
reform." (2010: 27). Additionally, pressure was rising to create fait accompli before the admission 
of new member states from Eastern and Central Europe into the EU in the 2000's: 
The admission of twelve or more member states would mean some dilution in the relative power of 
the existing members, and the 1999-2000 IGC was in some respects an attempt by the latter to re-
write the “rules of the game” before new members joined and would have a full say in any future re-
forms. (Van Oudenaren 2010: 27) 
Firstly, The Treaty of Amsterdam from 1997 on the other hand is noteworthy in regard to foreign 
and defence policies mainly due to two respects. On the one hand, the position of the High Repre-
sentative for CFSP was created in order to give the EU's foreign policy a single voice in interna-
tional meetings and conferences. On the other hand did links between the EU and the WEU become 
more concrete in order to include the operational capabilities of the WEU into the EU's CFSP 
framework, which included the Petersberg tasks into the EU (Van Oudenaren 2010: 26).  
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Secondly, the Saint Malo declaration is referred to as a concrete initial step towards a "capacity for 
autonomous action" for the EU, introducing a 50.000 to 60.000 contingent of soldiers for peace-
keeping and humanitarian intervention (Van Oudenaren 2010: 27). However, the EU again was not 
able to prevent the outbreak of the Kosovo crises which erupted in 1998. Again, NATO had to in-
tervene at the EU's doorstep. Still, while the EU failed in providing military crisis management as-
sistance in the crises on the Balkans, Oudenaren argues that  
[...] the EU played an important - indeed by far the most important - role in postwar reconstruction 
and assistance. This was in line with the EU's long-established role as a civilian power and drew on 
the same capacities that the EU had developed to assist the Central and Eastern European countries 
to prepare for EU membership by helping them rebuild their economies and political systems. (Van 
Oudenaren 2010: 27) 
Finally, the Treaty of Nice from 2001 led to internal reform and included a 'Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union'. It was however marked by disputes between the member states as to 
whether they should grant central EU-institutions more direct power or not. In regard to foreign 
policy, no incremental changes in the CFSP guidelines were made. However, the Treaty of Nice 
functioned effectively as the legal basis for the admission of the new EU member states in the 
2000s (Van Oudenaren 2010: 28). 
While these treaty advancements helped the EU to take its first steps as a foreign and security pol-
icy actor, experiences from the three-pillar structure of the EU and a lacking legal accountability of 
the EU itself in various policy fields led to the decision of the European Council to conduct a series 
of meetings involving the Commission, The European Parliament (EP) and member state govern-
ments in order to draft a constitution for the EU (Van Oudenaren 2010: 28). While the constitution 
eventually did not manage to get pulled through due to rejections from national referendums, vari-
ous steps for overcoming problems within the EU's institutional foreign policy structure were made 
by means of the compensating Lisbon Treaty, which was finalised in December 2007. 
The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty must be regarded as outstandingly important for the develop-
ment of the structure of the EU's foreign policy institutions, while many of the designations found 
in the Lisbon Treaty are based on earlier treaties. Title V, chapter 2 of the Lisbon treaty is founded 
on the EPC-principles from 1969, which was back then no binding policy regime and which solely 
relied on declarations of intent from the foreign ministers of the member states, as mentioned 
above. By means of the SEA, which can be seen as the first step towards binding determination of 
the EU/EC in international law, the EU took its first steps towards international accountability. Fur-
thermore does the same chapter of the Lisbon Treaty contain regulations from the CFSP section of 
the TEU from 1992, which was updated by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the Treaty of Nice 
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in 2001. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty can be seen as a result from these treaties (Hertwig 2009: 5-
9). 
The Lisbon Treaty did nevertheless incrementally change the internal structure of the EU as a whole 
by overcoming the former three-pillar structure and creating a single legal personality. We note that 
this drastically increased accountability of the EU as an actor in the international political arena. 
The new post of the 'High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' (HR) is a combi-
nation of the former 'High Representative for CFSP' and the Commission-member responsible for 
external affairs. The HR and the EEAS are prime examples for how the EU managed to achieve 
most of its goals concerning foreign policy reform inside the Lisbon Treaty, such as creating a "sin-
gle telephone number" of the HR in the new EU structure, as accurately described by Van Oude-
naren (2010: 29). The EEAS was introduced in 2010/2011, based on decisions made in the Lisbon 
Treaty. The EEAS serves as the new, full-scale diplomatic service of the EU. It includes the former 
CFSP, the EU's 'Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability' (CPCC), which serves as the civilian 
crisis management capability, the Crisis Management Department, the European Military Staff 
(EUMS) 
23
, as well as various regional directorates (ibid.)  
This overview of the development of the EU's foreign policy institutions will help to contextualise 
the EU’s non-proliferation capabilities in the following and to understand the rationale behind the 
development of the specific non-proliferation tools and policy formulations. Addressing the ques-
tion of why the EU has developed in its given way is important, if the presented thesis is to deal 
with the normative foundations of the actual non-proliferation policies of the EU. 
4.3 The EU's institutional and normative setup in non-proliferation policies 
The following chapter comprises the development of the EU's non-proliferation institutions and 
their capacities as well the development of the EU's non-proliferation policy framework. This will 
help us to discuss the EU's non-proliferation policy against the background of its normative founda-
tions in the following chapters. 
The track record of the EU's non-proliferation efforts is a debatable one, as widely varying opinions 
on and notions of it indicate. These range, as Kienzle points out, from the EU having performed 
well despite its structural restraints, to more sceptical notions due to the EU's internal divisions and 
resulting problems regarding substantial and tangible outcomes (Kienzle 2013: 1144, Zwolski 2011, 
Pardo 2012, Van Ham 2011, Cornish and Edwards 2005). In the following, a disquisition on both, 
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the development of the EU's non-proliferation structures and capabilities, as well as a brief over-
view of scholarly evaluations of these will be given in order to draw a coherent picture of the much 
debated current position of the EU in the international non-proliferation regime. This discussion can 
therefore be located within the 'Case: The EU’s non-proliferation policies' level of analysis as de-
picted in the methodology chapter. The subsequent analytical discussion of these will furthermore 
take place against the background of a theoretical framework which will be abstracted from the des-
ignations made in chapter 2.. 
Zwolski convincingly points out that it is important to assess the sui generis nature of the EU. 
However, in this thesis it will be argued that a holistic and comprehensive understanding of the 
"evolving entity, composed of numerous issue areas and policy networks, neither a full-blown pol-
ity nor a system of sovereign states [...]" that the EU is, can only stem from a deeper running his-
torical understanding of how its various parts came into being. Furthermore, the EU's drivers and 
motivations for developing these single parts must be revealed in order to discuss its single parts 
and actions in specific policy areas (Jupille and Caporaso 1998: 214; cited in: Zwolski 2011: 479). 
The development of the European Union's efforts in non-proliferation dates back as early as the 
starting days of the ECSC, alongside which the European Atomic Energy Community (EURA-
TOM) came into being through the Rome Treaties in 1957. EURATOM is "[...] endowed with far-
reaching competencies in the civilian nuclear industry of the Member States, including the opera-
tion of a verification and inspection system for the civilian fuel cycle." (Portela 2004: 2). This role 
was introverted to inner-European civilian nuclear issues and therefore need not be seen in direct 
context with external proliferation of WMD-related material. 
Later on, by means of the EPC in 1981, the EC overcame the formerly solely internally carried out 
notion of nuclear safety by "[...] bearing responsibility for external commercial nuclear relations, 
[...]", subsequently carrying out the formerly internal role of EURATOM externally in international 
forums and conferences by means of a working group that was set up by the European Council 
(Portela 2004: 2). This role contained a non-proliferation notion which was promoted by means of 
common statements of the member states in the UN and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), "[...] 
concentrating on the field of safeguards and nuclear transfers." (ibid.). 
Before the TEU in 1992 and the CFSP which came with it, "[...] European cooperation on non-
proliferation was informal and non-binding." (Zwolski 2011: 480; Smith 2002). It was nevertheless 
existent, as various examples from this stage of institutional development show. One notable exam-
ple for this is the external technical assistance to the former Soviet Union, which was based on legal 
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instruments from the first pillar of the European Community (EC) framework. This effort was 
geared towards safeguarding and hindering proliferation of CBRN material in post-Soviet Russia. 
They were based on Article 249 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEEC) and 
led to the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme (Zwol-
ski 2011: 481). By means of the ratification of the SEA in 1986, which aimed at the erection of a de 
facto single market inside the EU, economic aspects of security were taken also into consideration. 
These included energy security and connected nuclear energy safeguards (Portela 2004: 3). 
However, only by means of the CFSP as the second pillar of the newly formed European Union, the 
Union then had two more precise legal instruments at hand for engaging in non-proliferation ac-
tions, namely the formulation of common foreign policy positions as well as joint action plans. The 
EU's member states subsequently coordinated their positions on non-proliferation by means of these 
two foreign policy tools from the TEU onward, as Zwolski points out (2011: 481). On this note 
must the TEU and the CFSP be seen as a qualitative leap forward in foreign policy coordination of 
the EU member states, "[...] of which security is an integral part." (Portela 2004: 3).  
As the EU's foreign policy capacity gained more shape with the CFSP, this development inevitably 
had an impact on the EU’s role in non-proliferation policies and actions. As Portela notes, the EU's 
campaign for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was an important milestone of appearing 
as an actor in the international non-proliferation regime, e.g. (ibid.). The extension can also be seen 
as a hint to the unconditional support of UN-based multilateralism in non-proliferation, which got 
further specified later on in the 2000s. The EU has stressed on numerous occasions that its efforts in 
non-proliferation go hand in hand with the efforts of the United Nations in the field, as stated later 
on in the ESS and the ESS-Update from 2008 (Council 2003e, Council 2008: 11). 
However, as Zwolski points out, these efforts lacked an "overall political direction" (2011: 478). 
Only by means of the ESS from 2003, a more clearly defined general statement concerning EU-
related (and Europe-related) security came into being. Within the ESS, specific passages on the 
non-proliferation of WMD can be found, in which proliferation of WMD is labelled as "potentially 
the greatest threat to our [
24
] security" (Council 2003e, 2003b, Portela 2004: 2, 23-29, Kienzle 2013: 
1143, Zwolski 2011: 478). Nevertheless did the ESS "not go into detail about how to accomplish 
the mainstreaming of non-proliferation policies into the EU’s external relations" (Grip 2009: 3). 25  
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Connected to this stands the EU's WMD-strategy which was in fact agreed upon earlier in 2003, 
before the publication of the ESS. It aims to express a more specified, coherent EU strategy to ad-
dress the threat of proliferation. At this turning point of the EU's non-proliferation capacity devel-
opment stands the erection of a single secretariat dedicated to non-proliferation issues. The secre-
tariat is situated within the premises of the European Council, further adding up to the developing 
institutional structure of the EU in this field. Within the WMD strategy document, a precise evalua-
tion of the threat that WMD pose to the EU's security takes place. The ESS, its updated versions as 
well as the WMD Strategy thus pose the most concrete non-proliferation statements that the EU had 
ever launched (Council 2003c). 
Apart from these Council-based policy-statements, the specific structural setup of the EU in foreign 
policy matters has to be taken into consideration when evaluating the 'actorness' of the EU as a non-
proliferation actor, as this has direct impacts on the EU's capacity and efficiency in policy actions. 
Apart from the Council, also the Commission of the EU as well as the EU's single member states 
have always had their own agendas in regard to non-proliferation. However, subsequent to the rati-
fication of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the former CFSP got translated into the EEAS by means of 
the abolishing of the former three-pillar structure of the EU. This took place in order to set up a 
more coherent institutional structure, which is also of importance for the domain of foreign policy, 
as stated above. 
The emergence of the EU as a single legal personality through the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty 
must be seen as the second major leap forward in the development towards the EU's actorness in the 
non-proliferation regime, rendering the EU a more accountable actor in international politics alto-
gether (Zwolski 2011, Kienzle 2013, Pardo 2011). The financial instruments for engaging in non-
proliferation politics that the EEAS currently has at hands are the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and 
the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), which were created in 2006 as Commission 
tools for external assistance. Subsequent to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, this formerly 
Commission-based policy-tool got translated into the EEAS-domain (Zwolksi 2011: 482-483, 489). 
Additionally, the formerly Council-based CFSP budget for non-proliferation got translated into the 
EEAS (Kienzle 2013: 1148). 
While the still Council-based non-proliferation secretariat and ESS-based policies and discussions 
are handled within the EEAS post-Lisbon framework, we note that the European Commission con-
tinued to engage itself in external financial assistance programmes (Zwolski 2011: 482). According 
to Zwolski, this fragmentation of the EU's non-proliferation capacities rendered international coop-
eration partners in this policy domain unsatisfied. Only in January 2010, the respective bureaucratic 
52 
 
apparatuses of the EEAS and the Commission merged, thus creating the current institutional setup 
of the EU's non-proliferation capacities (ibid.). However, as Kienzle points out, the final structure 
of EU non-proliferation has  
[…] oddly enough, [...] essentially kept the old division between Council and Commission alive, cre-
ating a unit for WMD, conventional weapons and space, but anchoring the responsibility for the non-
proliferation programmes of the Instrument for Stability in another unit. (Kienzle 2013: 1149) 
Overlapping institutions within the EU which deal with issues in the same policy field continue to 
exist. Nevertheless has the EU engaged in centralised institutionalisation of its non-proliferation 
capacities, therefore becoming a more serious and accountable actor in non-proliferation policies, 
despite its own structural restrains. In the following, the so-called 'non-proliferation' will be dis-
cussed in detail. 
4.4 The non-proliferation clause 
Next to the financial tools mentioned in chapter 4.3., additional policy-measures related to non-
proliferation can be found within the EU's institutional setup. The non-proliferation clause, e.g., can 
be found in bilateral agreements since the year 2003, being part of the EU's WMD Strategy paper 
(Council 2003c). It states that non-proliferation  
[...] constitutes a fundamental element for the EU when it considers the decision of entering into ne-
gotiations with a third country or assesses the advisability of progressing towards a contractual rela-
tionship. (Council 2003c: 2).  
Initially, "[i]t was intended that the clause should be included as an essential element clause in all 
new, renewed or revised 'mixed agreements' between the European Union (EU) and non-EU states 
[...]"  (Grip 2009: 1). Mixed agreements here stand for agreements between the EU and third coun-
tries that combine political and economic dimensions. By including the non-proliferation clause into 
these agreements, adherence to non-proliferation commitments becomes conditional for these 
agreements (Grip 2009: 3). 
The non-proliferation clause goes hand in hand with normative statements concerning non-
proliferation found in the ESS from 2003, in which the threat of proliferation of WMD is named to 
be the potentially greatest threat to European Security. The non-proliferation strategy of the EU was 
ratified in accordance to the political Zeitgeist and the imminent pressure of the upcoming Eastern 
enlargement of the EU (Grip 2009: 2). The strategy papers Basic Principles for an EU Strategy 
against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Action Plan for the Implementation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Council 2003a, Council 2003b) in connection to the ESS paper 
and the updated ESS paper from 2008, in addition to still valid positions from earlier stages of ca-
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pacities-development, thus pose the contemporary policy framework that the EU is basing its ac-
tions in the non-proliferation regime on. 
The normative reasoning behind mainstreaming non-proliferation into mixed agreements between 
the EU and third states possibly creates a powerful policy-tool at hands of the EU (Kienzle 2013: 
1154). However, the specific nature of the clause itself must be taken into consideration when 
evaluating its possible effectiveness. First and foremost it is important to point out that the clause is 
divided into two parts, which will be examined in the following. This specific formulation of the 
clause is merely the specimen text: the formulation of the clause differs depending on the result of 
the negotiation process on the given mixed bilateral agreement between the EU and a third state. 
The first part of the non-proliferation clause serves as the "[...] "essential element" that must be in-
cluded in all third party mixed agreements [...]", which serves as a "[...] declaratory commitment by 
all parties to non-proliferation policies that they have already signed [...]". This means that it is con-
ditional for all mixed agreements with third states (Quille 2007: 3). The first part of the non-
proliferation clause merely acknowledges reassures the existing obligation and commitment of third 
states: 
 "Non-proliferation clause" to be included in agreements with third countries  
Countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
The Parties consider that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of deliv-
ery, both to state and non-state actors, represent one of the most serious threats to international sta-
bility and security. The Parties therefore agree to co-operate and to contribute to countering the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery through full compliance with 
and national implementation of their existing obligations under international disarmament and non-
proliferation treaties and agreements and other relevant international obligations. (Council 2003c: 4) 
 
This part of the clause is conditional in the sense that if a contracting partner violates its conditions, 
a consultation procedure takes place which might light to the cancellation of the affected agreement. 
This conditional part of the clause can be regarded in terms of a multilateral approach towards a 
multilateral non-proliferation system in that it binds both contractual sides to the specifications 
made in the clause. 
The second part of the non-proliferation clause on the other hand is not conditional for mixed 
agreements, unlike the part mentioned above. It includes elements that must be considered elemen-
tal only by means of a 'case by case' basis and reads as following: 
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The parties agree that this provision constitutes an essential element of this agreement. The parties 
furthermore agree to cooperate and to contribute to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery by: 
• taking steps to sign, ratify, or accede to, as appropriate, and fully implement all 
other relevant international instruments; 
• the establishment of an effective system of national export controls, controlling 
the export as well as transit WMD related of goods, including a WMD end-use 
control on dual use technologies and containing effective sanctions for breaches 
of export controls. * 
The Parties agree to establish a regular political dialogue that will accompany and 
consolidate these elements. 
* These two elements might be considered as essential elements on a case by case 
basis. (Council 2003c: 4) 
In accordance to this, new commitments in the non-proliferation of CBRN weapons and related 
material are not mandatory for the ratification of mixed agreements between the EU and third states. 
These two additional elements of the clause would put immediate stress on contracting partners who 
do not take part in various non-proliferation regimes, such as India, Pakistan and Israel, who would 
have to sign the NPT, as Quille points out (2007: 3). The non-proliferation clause must be seen in 
the wider context of the EU's non-proliferation norms and goals as Quille further rightly argues: 
third states would receive widespread support and aid from the EU in case the second part of the 
non-proliferation clause got signed and ratified. The formulation of a 'case by case' basis is prob-
lematic, as it is not specified under which conditions the unconditional element might be excluded.  
In regard to foreign policy action, the following explanation for the actual setup of the clause can be 
found within the Action Plan: 
The EU will consider the introduction of an effective stick and carrot policy linked to non-
proliferation commitments in its relations with third countries. This will be done in particular in the 
context of co-operation agreements or assistance programmes. Relevant working groups will be 
tasked to review EU policy towards particular countries. In this context combined sessions of re-
gional working groups and the working group on non-proliferation could be organised to promote 
cross-fertilisation of regional and non-proliferation policies. (Concil 2003b: 6) 
Due to the fact that the second part of the clause is not conditional for mixed agreements, the pres-
sure for contracting third states to further engage themselves in the non-proliferation regime is not 
overwhelming. On the contrary, there is an almost complete absence of  leverage in terms of foreign 
policy conduct of the EU. 
While initially it has been unclear which international treaties on non-proliferation and disarmament 
have been addressed in the non-proliferation clause, specifications on this followed in terms of the 
Note on the implementation of the WMD clause: 
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While the relevant existing obligations clearly depend on the specific country the EU is negotiating 
with, in general terms the clause here refers, inter alia, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (including the 
IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocols), the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and the relevant UNSC Resolutions, 
[...], Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Council 2009a) 
This extension is not only an important supplement to the effectiveness of the non-proliferation 
clause as a policy measure: It places the clause amidst the international non-proliferation regime as 
depicted in chapter 4.1.. 
The results of the non-proliferation clause have not been clear so far, although it has been included 
in over a hundred contractual relationships (Kienzle 2013: 1154). The fact that the non-proliferation 
clause has been included in bilateral agreements in a selective manner, excluding it in certain cases, 
stands at the starting point of the theoretical puzzle that the EU's non-proliferation policies poses. 
While the non-proliferation clause could possibly serve as a strong policy tool for enforcing adher-
ence to institutions of the international non-proliferation regime (such as the NPT-regime), Kienzle 
notes that "[...] virtually none of the more problematic countries that have only ratified only a few 
(if any) non-proliferation agreements have been targeted successfully." (Kienzle 2013: 1154). 
According to Kienzle, this foreign policy behavior runs under the label of "effective multilateral-
ism" (2013: 1146). While he praises the EU for being a credible international actor and engaging in 
'effective multilateralism' by overcoming self-set norms when needed in order to achieve goals in 
the arena of international politics, the research of the thesis does not provide such evaluations of the 
EU's performance in the non-proliferation regime as such: these can be found elsewhere (Grip 2009, 
Katsioulis & Mölling 2010, Kienzle 2013, Zwolski 2011, e.g.). 
These developments are remarkable, given the fact that non-proliferation supposedly "[...] consti-
tutes a fundamental element for the EU when it considers the decision of entering into negotiations 
with a third country or assesses the advisability of progressing towards a contractual relationship" 
(Council 2003c: 2; quoted in: Grip 2009: 3). On this note and in connection to previous normative 
statements on the EU's status on non-proliferation, it is safe to assume that the EU has set itself cer-
tain double standards when it comes to EU-based action in the non-proliferation regime. 
The EU's non-adherence to self-defined positions and standards on non-proliferation in given cases 
(such as India, Pakistan and Israel) are worth being investigated from a theoretical point of view, 
given an ongoing discourse on the notion of 'Normative Power Europe' as mentioned earlier on: the 
question whether the EU is a consistent normative actor or not arises. The discussion of the working 
hypothesis and the research question of the thesis are tightly connected to theoretical views on the 
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EU's actorness in foreign policy and specifically, as the case study in the thesis will show, non-
proliferation policies towards India. The case study which will be constructed in the following 
chapters thus aims at the discussion of the stress-field between the EU's normative non-proliferation 
basis and the actual conduct of related policies. In the centre of this stands a theory-testing exercise 
that will aim to stimulate further research on the EU's supposedly normative conduct of policies in 
different policy-fields: "When theories are fairly well developed, researchers can use case studies 
for theory testing." (George and Bennett 2005: 115). 
5. ANALYSIS: THE EU AS AN INCONSISTENT ACTOR IN THE NON-
PROLIFERATION REGIME 
In the following chapter, the objectives of the research as outlined in the introductory chapter will 
be achieved. In order to do so, firstly, a coherent research framework will be depicted, which is 
based on the theoretical deliberations from chapter 2. in that it combines all important theoretical 
tenets which are needed for the discussion of the research question. More specifically, it will be 
argued and explained that role theory can provide an understanding of the fact that the EU's non-
proliferation policy does not always correspond to its normative foundation, while it is nevertheless 
backed up by a credible institutional structure. Furthermore, this discussion is reliant on the terms 
provided in the theoretical outline on normative foreign policy as well as on the specifications on 
the EU as a foreign policy actor, as provided above. As the result of this discussion, the notion of 
the EU being as prone to failing in keeping normative consistency in foreign policy as any other 
foreign policy actor will stand. On this note, Manners' theoretical construct of 'Normative Power 
Europe' will partly be refuted in the light of the conducted case study. Accordingly, the delibera-
tions of this chapter will form the beginning of the theory building exercise of this thesis. 
Subsequently, the case study will be approached. Initially, a discussion which analyses the inclusion 
and exclusion of the unconditional element of the non-proliferation clause in mixed agreements 
between the EU and third states will take place. By demonstrating that the EU is not consistently 
including both properly formulated parts of the non-proliferation clause into mixed agreements with 
third states, the first statistical sample will be depicted. This supports the theoretical claims made 
above, namely that the EU is an inconsistent normative actor in the non-proliferation regime. Con-
nected to this statistical sample, the case study of the EU's non-proliferation policy towards India 
will be discussed. While the provided sample depicts a number of possible case studies, the case of 
the EU's non-proliferation policy towards India has been specifically chosen due to the availability 
of data, as well as due to the fact that conducting one case study in a sufficiently narrowed down 
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research context is enough to lead to theory advancement; this also goes hand in hand with Man-
ners' methodological approach on NPE. The analysis of the available data against the background of 
the EU's non-proliferation policy will serve as the proof of an inconsistency of the EU's policy ac-
tions in this field. 
5.1. Research Framework: How does role theory provide an understanding of why the EU's 
non-proliferation norms and policies do not correspond? 
In the following, a theoretically coined research framework incorporating relevant theoretical tenets 
from chapter 2. will be depicted, which must be regarded relevant for the discussion of the case 
study and accordingly the research question. In fact, this framework will help to gain an understand-
ing of why a foreign policy actor's norms and the actual conduct of foreign policy do not necessarily 
correspond. Firstly, role theory as depicted in chapter 2.3. will experience a necessary subsumption 
in order to be applicable to the case study. Secondly, implications from this discussion for the con-
ceptual arrangement of NPE, as depicted in chapter 2.2. will be highlighted. The discussed theoreti-
cal tenets will merge into a coherent research framework which highlights the need of studying 
NPE from the chosen thematic angle of non-proliferation policy. The theory testing and theory de-
velopment exercise, as depicted in the methodological chapter of this thesis will subsequently take 
place by the case study of the EU's non-proliferation policy towards India.  
While roles as patterned behaviour are stable and not prone to sudden incremental change, they are 
sensitive to context and the course of time. A role conflict can always emerge within a role set, for 
example "[...] when dominant role conceptions are incompatible or contradictory to one another." 
(Aggestam 2006: 22). Contrarily, a role conception is stable when "[...] it is central and compatible 
with other roles within the role-set." (Aggestam 2006: 23). In order to capture both, the continual, 
as well as the flexible/changing dimensions of roles in any given case such as the one discussed in 
this thesis, the role conceptions of a role need to be investigated through three perspectives on roles. 
In the following, these three perspectives on roles of foreign policy actors are provided, which set a 
foundational basis for the discussion of the EU and its different roles it is employing as a non-
proliferation actor. All three perspectives must be incorporated simultaneously if an analysis is to 
relate a given role convincingly to the structure it is embedded in: 
[…] [I]n doing so we bring the individual back in without reducing our explanations of foreign pol-
icy to the individual as the unit of analysis. (Hollis and Smith 1990: 168; quoted in: Aggestam 2006: 
19) 
The first perspective that needs to be employed is the institutional one. As will be argued in the 
following, the institutional perspective is important as it helps to contextualise how inter-subjective 
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beliefs and political culture influence foreign policy. Roles are deeply embedded in institutions: 
institutions organise the available roles and the way in which they are employed. They can be un-
derstood in terms of general patterns or categorisations of activities as formally or informally hu-
man-constructed entities. However, apart from broad definitions like this, Aggestam notes that an 
institution can also assume the shape of a specific organisational arrangement, such as the EU 
(2006: 15). 
This is also applicable to various subordinated institutions within the EU. In regard to non-
proliferation namely, the EU's whole set of institutions as depicted in chapters 4.2. - 4.4. accounts 
for the same foundational normative rationale: it was founded on the overarching normative princi-
ples of the super-ordinate structure of the EU as a whole. It is vital to stress that the institutional 
perspective on the EU's role as a non-proliferation actor depicts an integrated foreign policy actor, 
which has sufficiently been proven in chapters 4.2. - 4.4.. However, as has been argued above, until 
today certain parallel structures within the institutional non-proliferation setup of the EU continue 
to exist. This in addition to possible member-states' own interests within the policy field may com-
plicate a unified role of the EU in regard to the institutional perspective. A multiplicity of possible, 
employable roles on this take could possibly undermine the consistency of the EU's non-
proliferation policies. Furthermore, according to the complexity of the structure and the multiplicity 
of actors in the EU's non-proliferation policies, there is a high probability that various role-sets with 
a considerable number of employable roles exists. 
The organisation of a specific role within an institution takes place by means of a set of normative 
constraints towards a foreign policy actor's behaviour. These constraints and rules, which determine 
a role, "[...] must be durable and must prescribe behavioural roles for actors, besides constraining 
activity and shaping expectations." (Aggestam 2006: 15; ref. to: Keohane 1994: 49). What this con-
sequently means for the behaviour of a foreign policy actor is accurately depicted by Horrocks and 
Jackson:  
In behaviour an identity is implemented by the taking of a role. A role taken is a concrete behav-
ioural manifestation and implementation of one or more of an individual’s identities, presenting the 
observer a picture of the identity in action. (Horrocks and Jackson 1972: 115; quoted in: Aggestam 
2006: 16) 
In the context of the EU as a foreign policy actor in the non-proliferation regime, this notion has 
far-ranging consequences for research on any policy-action/behaviour. In any given policy field, the 
EU can employ a number of roles which are all based on a selection of corresponding norms. What 
follows this, is the question of which role is actually being employed in a given policy-action. As 
mentioned above, the multiplicity of possible actors connected to the EU in this policy field and 
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their respective role-sets complicate any analysis on specific conducted roles and their impact on 
policy. However,  deploying the following two perspectives in role analysis can help to explain the 
role-choice made by a foreign policy actor. 
The perspective on a foreign policy actor's interaction unsurprisingly regards the interactional proc-
ess itself. This notion implies that roles have many variations which are undergoing constant 
change, as the idea of an inflexible conception of a role would exclude the dynamic mutual nature 
of social interactions. Accordingly, by means of these variations of roles within any interaction be-
tween foreign policy actors, the emergence of new roles on a supranational level constantly takes 
place. Interaction with other actors can have innovative consequences, meaning that actors might 
improve their role performance through interaction (Aggestam 2006: 15). 
A perspective on these processes can accordingly not only expose the new roles, but also, and more 
importantly, highlight an actor's capacity for defining its own roles (Aggestam 2006: 16). Con-
nected to this stands Margaret Mead’s classic concept of symbolic interactionism, which posits that 
symbols and meaning emerge from a process of social interaction that shape behaviour: Research 
on specific policy actions can thus help to approximate the specific role which a foreign policy actor 
is taking (Mead 1934; ref. in: Aggestam 2006: 16-17). This can be achieved by means of analysing 
the EU's actual conduct of foreign policy actions in the field of non-proliferation. 
It is important to bear in mind that this perspective does not suffice on its own. Firstly, as Aggestam 
notes, actors "[…] arrive at their interaction with pre-existing identities and roles.". Secondly, it is 
difficult to "[…] incorporate interests and objectives that flow outside the interaction within which 
actors are immersed in at any given time." (Aggestam 2006: 17). In regard to the notion of the EU 
as a non-proliferation actor, in any interaction with other actors in the non-proliferation regime, it is 
to be expected that the EU is not employing one single unified role: the behaviour of all actors in 
the interactional sphere influences the roles of all affected actors, thus further complicating the task 
of identifying specific roles within the role-sets of the actors. 
Last but not least, the third perspective, namely the intentional one must be applied. As Aggestam 
notes, this perspective "[…] brings to our attention how actors themselves are involved in defining 
roles" and furthermore "[…] that these roles may contain objectives as well as norms." (Aggestam 
2006: 17). This leads to the notion that a foreign policy actor's roles are not exclusively built 
through factors to be found within the first and second perspective. Instead, the foreign policy mak-
er is itself actively involved in the construction of roles based on self-made considerations, reason-
ing and calculations. The actor thus is an "[…] individual capable of exercising some freedom in the 
60 
 
choice of ends and means of action." (Aggestam 2006: 17). In most cases, roles are likely to leave 
the actor with a certain scope for interpretation when making policy choices: 
Human agents are knowledgeable and reflect continuously on the conditions and consequences of 
their actions, but they are also finite in their capabilities of action and perception. (Aggestam 2006: 
18; ref. to: Giddens 1979: 215-216)  
If this perspective is employed onto the EU's non-proliferation role-set, the EU's actions account for 
an intentional basis as they are founded on the political discourse within the EU institutions: the EU 
is an accountable and intentional actor in the non-proliferation regime, as the course of its institu-
tional development and the regarding normative statements show. However, in order to validate this 
notion of an intentional basis, in the following Tocci's concept of normative foreign policy will be 
applied. 
As explained in chapter 2.2., several variables must be checked in the analysis of a normative for-
eign policy actor. The normative goal variable depicts whether a foreign policy is planned norma-
tively or not, meaning whether the policy is meant to follow milieu goals in its setup or not. If a 
normative foreign policy formulation is based on values and norms, on the contrary to the posses-
sion-goal related nation state interest, the resulting policy aims to shape or alter conditions beyond 
their national boundaries. This is certainly true for the EU's non-proliferation policy. As chapters 
4.2. - 4.4. have sufficiently shown, the EU's foreign policy and non-proliferation policy is deeply 
entangled with, and based on its core values and norms: they are conditional for both, the develop-
ment of the connected institutions as well as their policy formulations.  
If according to Tocci, the pursuit of milieu goals becomes manifest in international organisations, 
law and regimes, we note that in the context of the EU's non-proliferation policy, the EU's uncondi-
tional support of non-proliferation organisations related to the UN framework serves exactly the 
same purpose. Furthermore, by means of own non-proliferation policy formulations, the EU aims to 
be a credible non-proliferation actor on its own and have an impact in the overall non-proliferation 
regime. The EU has formulated milieu goals within the international non-proliferation regime as has 
been shown in chapters 4.2. - 4.4.. This is not only displayed by the EU's participation in interna-
tional conferences on non-proliferation: various own action plans and connected non-proliferation 
programmes as well as the non-proliferation clause are most noteworthy to this respect. 
The second variable, the normative means, refers to a foreign policy actor's capability to enforce its 
self-defined normative foreign policy goals. As has been argued above, "[t]he question about 
whether the means of a foreign policy are normative or not refers to how policy instruments are 
used for achieving milieu goals, instead of merely which ones" (p.19). The EU's instruments for 
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engaging in non-proliferation stem straight from the development of the EU's foreign policy institu-
tions. All of the depicted action plans and policy measures, such as the non-proliferation clause, are 
tightly connected to the institutionalised normative foreign policy goals. Accordingly, they are con-
sistent with the legal setup of the EU: 
Legality in the deployment of foreign policy instruments relates first to the legal commitments if a 
foreign policy actor towards itself, i.e., the deployment of foreign policies in respect of internal legal 
standards of democracy, transparency and accountability. (Tocci 2008: 10; ref. to: Stavridis 2001: 9) 
The EU's normative foreign policy means do not only comply with internal standards: by connect-
ing itself to the international non-proliferation regime under the UN's aegis, the EU sufficiently 
managed to approximate its non-proliferation profile as close towards universal validity as possible 
under the given circumstances. Accordingly, the EU's normative non-proliferation goals and means 
can be regarded as being consistent with the definitions provided by Tocci. These have been con-
structed intentionally: the consistency and path dependency of the development of the EU's non-
proliferation institutions must be highlighted on this note. While this development has not been 
without drawbacks and delays, the specific nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor has to be 
taken into consideration. Institutional development within the EU is necessarily more complicated 
than within nation states. We conclude that the EU is an intentional non-proliferation actor in terms 
of its goals and means. 
However, the EU's normative impact in non-proliferation policy accounts for a mixed track record. 
In order to evaluate this, it is sensible to again quote Tocci: 
A normative impact is one where a traceable path can be drawn between an international player's di-
rect or indirect actions and inactions (or series of actions) on the one hand and the effective building 
and entrenchment of an international rule-bounded environment on the other. (Tocci 2008: 11) 
While having the given set of policy tools to engage in non-proliferation at its disposal, it is hard to 
draw a definite, traceable path between the EU's actions and an alteration of the international non-
proliferation regime. As has been argued above, the EU has refined its institutional setup in regard 
to non-proliferation policy in order to become a more accountable and recognisable actor. Given the 
theoretical focus of this thesis, a 'policy impact' in the non-proliferation regime refers to binding 
states to the international non-proliferation regime. Accordingly, in the research of this thesis, a 
non-proliferation actor's impact on the regime (or respective sub-regimes) will be measured in terms 
of legally binding commitments of state actors to the non-proliferation regime. Utilising this kind of 
proxy can help to contextualise the findings of the provided dataset and case study in a way that 
their impact on the existing legal framework can be measured. In terms of the research of this the-
sis, this proxy is the international non-proliferation regime as depicted in chapter 4.1.. While the 
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international non-proliferation regime is by no means fully comprehensive as it still has several 
shortcomings, it is by far the most institutionalised combined human effort to counter the real exist-
ing threat of a spread of WMD and related material. Accordingly, any alteration of the non-
proliferation regime in terms of the legal binding of additional states to its specification can be re-
garded as an 'impact' on the regime.  
While a study on the actual impact of the EU's non-proliferation policy in terms of an alteration of 
the regime as a whole is scientifically feasible, the questions discussed in this thesis require a 
slightly different research focus. An alleged consistency or inconsistency of the EU as an actor in 
the non-proliferation regime must necessarily be studied in terms of an observable policy impact. 
By means of this research perspective, the consistency of a foreign policy, or a foreign policy 
change in a given actor can be proven or refuted. 
As Aggestam notes, role conflicts are a very frequent stimuli for foreign policy change, which 
would presumably "[...] initiate a search for change, given the actor's inherent desire for consistency 
and cognitive stability." (2006: 23). Accordingly, if foreign policy changes in the context of the 
development of the EU's non-proliferation policy are to be discussed as a whole, the reasons for 
why role conflicts emerge must be revealed.  
On the one hand, a role-set consists of a number of different roles which are generated from possi-
bly different institutional contexts: actors incorporate different roles and they are therefore subject 
to a number of conflicting role expectations. Role-conflicts are more likely, when "[...] the condi-
tions and the context within they were formulated change." (Aggestam 2006: 23). On the other 
hand, it is important to bear in mind that 
[...] integrated and consensual role scenarios are the glue that holds collectivities together; just as 
discrepant and competitive scenarios are the acid that paralyze or tear them apart. (Aggestam 2006: 
23).  
The integrity of a foreign policy actor is crucially dependent on the interplay and bond between 
identity and role. The more these are interconnected, the more resilient a role conception is towards 
a role conflict and thus a policy change. It is pivotal for the research framework of this thesis to 
stress that "[...] the role will be unstable if the contents, in terms of norms and objectives, are incon-
sistent." (Aggestam 2006: 24). As a given foreign policy actor aims to stay consistent in terms of its 
roles 
26
, it may manipulate information on the roles towards other actors. If this however fails, an 
increasingly inconsistent foreign policy is the result. We note that inconsistency may also stem from 
a lack of consensus about the actual meaning of a role (ibid.). 
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 or at least aims to keep the perception of its roles by other actors consistent 
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Aggestam adds that while a role conflict might undermine the standing of a foreign policy actor in 
the international political arena, they are far from occurring on a seldom basis. Contradictions 
within single roles, or more relevantly in the context of the conduct of foreign policy, contradictions 
within whole role-sets occur frequently. Most foreign policy actors do not manage to stay consistent 
with their normative foundations (Aggestam 2006: 24; Aggestam 2004a: 245-248). 
To conclude this theoretical subsumption on roles and role conflicts with the immediate outcome 
for foreign policy, it is stated that whether a role conflict becomes manifest or not always depends 
on the specific foreign policy actor and its skill and motivation to stay coherent with a chosen for-
eign policy role. In regard to the EU as a foreign policy actor, the complexity of available roles is 
considerable:  
[...], the EU must be understood in terms of its 'complex and multifaceted international identity' in-
volving 'a complex and fluid negotiation of multiple relational identities' [...]. This complexity and 
multiplicity of identities is clearly reflected in the plurality of roles which the EU plays at any one 
time, in any one place. (Manners 2006c: 81) 
Any of the multiple roles employed by the EU is reliant and based on values. However, the EU's 
international identity is based on a number of core values, which have already roughly been 
sketched in chapter 2.1.:  
The principles of democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights form the ideo-
logical basis of the EU and were already mentioned in the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on Euro-
pean identity: they were first translated into a constitutional framework within the TEU. (p.21) 
Manners' addition to this depicts an extended picture of "the EU's normative constitution", which 
includes the core norms of peace, liberty, democracy, human rights, the rule of law equality, social 
solidarity, sustainable development and good governance (Manners 2006c: 70). 
These nine core norms of the EU, as depicted and employed throughout the NPE research frame-
work by Manners, serve as the various roles the EU can employ in a given policy area. In the fol-
lowing, a brief overview of the EU's roles which can possibly be employed in the policy area of 
non-proliferation will be provided.  
Firstly, based on the initial vision of post-war statesmen such as Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and 
Konrad Adenauer, the EU as a peace project must be mentioned. After two devastating world wars 
which left the European continent in ruins, a rapid shift from thinking in competing nationalistic 
terms was needed. While the geopolitical situation after World War II divided the European conti-
nent into two strictly separate spheres of interest, a reconciliation between the 'hereditary enemies' 
Germany and France successfully took place and furthermore included other industrialised Western 
64 
 
European States. The Coal and Steel Union, while being a project of economic integration at that 
time, can be connected to the EU's role as a peace actor of a very general denomination; this role 
was carried out within the inner (Western-) European limits. Nevertheless, it got expanded after the 
end of the Cold War by integrating Central and Eastern European states, bringing the historically 
longest sustained period of peace to the European continent 
27
. Secondly, the EU's role as an eco-
nomic actor must be taken into consideration. As has been discussed in chapter 4.2., for decades the 
EC remained an economically integrated institution with an inward political focus. Due to the long 
and strong track record of European economic integration, the EU's role as an economic actor might 
be considered the strongest and most integrated role, especially in comparison to the EU's role as a 
foreign policy actor. Thirdly, the EU's role as a non-proliferation actor must be mentioned. It corre-
sponds to the depiction of the EU's institutional arrangement of non-proliferation policy from chap-
ter 4.3..  
The EU's foundational norms are very broad and account for the very basic ideational foundation of 
the EU, they are still of importance for policy formulations in any policy field that the EU is en-
gaged in. Without the normative 'backing' and the application of different roles, the EU would not 
have developed into its current state. However, in analytical terms, it is very hard and maybe im-
possible to get a proper analytical grip on these kinds of broad norms and measure them statisti-
cally. This leaves us with the rather unsatisfying notion that the normative nature of the EU which 
affects foreign policy can hardly be measured precisely. 
For the research of this thesis, this means that norms which are responsible for different roles within 
the EU's foreign policy role set cannot explicitly be identified and arranged coherently on one level 
of analysis. Accordingly, the question of how a proper role conception of the EU in foreign policy 
and in non-proliferation looks like arises, or more specifically, which role actually is employed. In 
regard to the case study of the EU's non-proliferation policy towards India, several possible role 
conflicts are possible to imagine, such as a role conflict between the EU's role as a economic and a 
non-proliferation actor. In this specific case, it is possible that the EU would evaluate economic 
gains through trade and economic cooperation higher than achieving non-proliferation goals. How-
ever, without a proper statistical and factual backing, claims like this remain of a speculative nature. 
While this is a scientific puzzle worth being investigated, this is not what this thesis aims to discuss. 
Conclusively, it is stated that it is hard if not impossible through the available theoretical and ana-
lytical means presented in this thesis to specifically point out which roles in regard to non-
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 With notable exceptions such as the prolonged conflict in former Yugoslavia, e.g. 
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proliferation policy of the EU exist within the EU's foreign policy role-set. The inherently fluent 
and ever-changing nature of the EU's role set, whose roles are all based on norms of a multiplicity 
of actors and their respective interests, pose a major scientific puzzle. The normative foreign policy 
goals and means of the EU in the policy area of non-proliferation can nevertheless accurately be 
depicted, they pose the foundation of what the EU is possibly able to do. The normative foreign 
policy impact of the EU in the same policy area on the other hand is what will be analysed in the 
following. 
It will be argued that while a role-conflict within the EU's foreign policy role-set exists, it is not 
possible to identify which role-conflict it specifically is. Instead, the most likely role conflict will be 
depicted, namely the one between the EU's role as an economic and non-proliferation actor; this 
notion is supported by scholarly opinions and the findings from the conducted case study. While the 
EU is an intentional and properly institutionalised non-proliferation actor by means of its normative 
foreign policy goals and means as has sufficiently been shown above, its normative foreign policy 
impact must be discussed in order to come to a conclusion on the EU's consistency in the policy 
field. This can best be achieved by means of a statistical sample which also includes the case study 
of this thesis. It will be argued that role conflicts within the EU's non-proliferation policy exist, 
which notably undermine a coherent picture of the EU as a non-proliferation actor. As has been 
depicted in the methodological treatise of this thesis, this notion will be discussed against a twofold 
background. Firstly, a dataset provided by Hertwig on the inclusion and exclusion and the specific 
formulation of the non-proliferation in bilateral mixed agreements will be depicted, in order to 
reach a broader informed perspective on the inconsistency of the EU's non-proliferation policy 
(2009). Secondly, the case study of the EU's non-proliferation policy towards India will further nar-
row down the scientific focus of the theory testing exercise of this thesis. By means of the combina-
tion of these two methodologies, namely utilising the dataset as well as the case study, the possible 
pitfall of case selection bias, which might harm the validity of this study, can be avoided. 
Accordingly, the question of whether the EU is a consistent or inconsistent normative foreign policy 
actor can and will be discussed by other means than through a contrasting juxtaposition of different 
roles of unclear normative origin. In other words, in the following it will not be discussed why the 
EU is an inconsistent normative non-proliferation actor; the selected methodology and the research 
focus are not capable of achieving this (possible) research objective. Instead it will be argued that 
based on actual existing statistical evidence, that the EU in fact does not adhere to its normative 
foundation as depicted by its normative foreign policy goals and means in the policy field of non-
proliferation. For the sake of discussing the research question, it is sufficient to point out that a role 
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conflict exists. While a depiction of the specific role conflict might not lie within the reach of the 
conducted research, the predominance of the EU's economic role makes it likely that it does not 
employ its non-proliferation role in the selected case study. At the end of this discussion, the find-
ings from the analysis of the dataset and the case study will refer back to the initial theoretical out-
line of this thesis and facilitate the intended theory testing exercise. 
5.2. Dataset and Case Study: The case of India and the inclusion and exclusion of the uncondi-
tional element of the non-proliferation clause in mixed agreements 
In the following, the case study as formulated in the methodological chapter will be conducted. Ini-
tially, an overview of the country-specific proliferation dangers related to India will be provided. 
This aims achieve a number of research objectives. Namely it will be argued that given its arsenal 
of WMD, India is a notable stakeholder in the proliferation regime of WMD and that India is not 
participating in the international non-proliferation regime. Accordingly, in regard to possible non-
proliferation related foreign policy, it will be noted that India is indeed a very relevant test-case for 
the non-proliferation efforts of the EU. By inserting the non-proliferation clause into a mixed 
agreement with India, a notable stakeholder of WMD could experience a rapprochement and even-
tual inclusion into the non-proliferation regime. The classification of the specific proliferation risks 
connected to India in its regional context will serve as the basis for a critical discussion on the EU's 
non-proliferation policy towards India in the following. As has been argued above, this test-case 
poses the theory-testing exercise of Ian Manners notion of NPE; the findings of this case study and 
its implications for the NPE framework will be summed up in the following chapter. 
The original motivation of India to start its own nuclear weapons programme stems from the launch 
of the first Chinese nuclear bombs in the 1960s; the first Indian nuclear weapon tests can be re-
garded as a reaction to the Chinese nuclear capacities and were subsequently conducted in the 
1970s (Hertwig 2009: 96). According to Gupta, the then still young Indian nation, which was still in 
a process of self-identification, feared possible blackmailing from the Chinese side (Gupta 1968: 
72). Additionally, knowledge of a competing Pakistani nuclear weapons programme further in-
creased Indian security worries. China supported Pakistan heavily in its proliferation efforts. Tech-
nical assistance for Pakistan on all of the following necessary steps towards gaining a deployable 
nuclear weapons capability originated from China, namely the knowledge of building a nuclear 
bomb, the delivery of the necessary initial material as well as rocket technology for deploying a 
nuclear warhead (Scheffran 2007: 13, Schneider Jr. 2010: 46). However, in order to complete its 
nuclear weapons capacity building, Pakistan also had to obtain material by illegal means (Hertwig 
2009: 98). Accordingly, India was trapped within the existent regional proliferation dynamics at the 
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time. In 1998, in a matter of months, Pakistan as well as India shocked the world with a number of 
further nuclear weapons tests: the current non-proliferation regime against nuclear weapons had 
failed to prevent the spread of these weapons in the region (Krause 1999: 5). These tests were con-
demned and sanctioned by the UN as well as by the EU (Hertwig 2009: 97). 
Until today, India is one of the three states which have never been part of the NPT (among Israel 
and Pakistan). The refusal of these states to join the NPT prevents universality of the NPT in regard 
to international law. India is neither part of the CWC, nor has it ratified the HCoC (Hertwig 2009: 
97). According to current estimates, India has between 90-110 nuclear warheads at its disposal 
(SIPRI 2013: 12). However, due to the fact that no official statements on the nuclear arsenal of 
these three states exist, the latest SIPRI report notes that "[...] the available information is often con-
tradictory, incorrect and exaggerated." (ibid.). Nevertheless, an Indian nuclear weapons stockpile 
outside of any verification mechanisms continues to exist and expand. There are currently no self-
induced non-proliferation efforts observable in either states. Instead, India and Pakistan are  
[...] increasing the size and the sophistication of their nuclear arsenals. Both countries are developing 
and deploying new types of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missile and both are increasing their 
military fissile material production capabilities. (SIPRI 2013: 13) 
India's status as an unofficial nuclear power poses a challenge to the international non-proliferation 
regime. As a matter of fact, India has managed to develop its nuclear weapons programme outside 
of all verification systems with technical assistance from varying parties. The importance of the 
Indian case in non-proliferation policy becomes even more clear if seen in the regional context with 
another unofficial nuclear power, Pakistan. Until today, the competitive situation between India and 
Pakistan over the Kashmir region remains unresolved and poses the real existing danger of a re-
gionalised conflict bearing nuclear weapons (Rauch 2008: 29). In 2004 both states declared they 
would not conduct any further nuclear weapons tests, in case that there would not be any extraordi-
nary incidents or events (Hertwig 2009: 100). What this means in case of a further outbreak of in-
terstate violence in the region remains unclear. 
In conclusion, it is stated that India remains a country with a high proliferation risk: not only is its 
nuclear stockpile growing and becoming modernised, but also the ongoing protracted conflict with 
Pakistan over Kashmir led to a regionally confined armaments race for more efficient weapons 
technology. It is noteworthy that while Pakistan has signalled that it would join the NPT in case 
India would ratify it, until today India refuses to do so. According to Boor, the reasons for India's 
refusal to take a notable step towards an easing of the regional proliferation tension can be found 
within India's security concerns towards China (Boor 2008; ref. in: Hertwig 2009: 100). Accord-
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ingly, non-proliferation efforts in this region are dearly needed. Due to the fact that the traditional 
diplomatic efforts have failed to include India into the international non-proliferation regime, a new 
take on the region's proliferation dynamics, such as through a new foreign policy initiative, is nec-
essary. 
In the following, the track record of the EU's non-proliferation clause as a foreign policy measure 
which aims to mainstream non-proliferation commitments into mixed bilateral agreements will be 
analysed. Firstly, a dataset provided by Hertwig will show that the EU has indeed included the non-
proliferation clause into mixed bilateral agreements in order to mainstream non-proliferation efforts. 
Secondly, the specific formulation(s) of the clause will be discussed, as they vary heavily depending 
on which agreement they get included into. Thirdly, the EU's non-proliferation efforts towards India 
will be discussed by means of various bilateral agreements between India and the EU. As has been 
argued above, India is a country with an increased proliferation risk, which is embedded in an even 
riskier regional proliferation context with Pakistan and China. Accordingly, discussing any foreign 
policy actor's non-proliferation policy towards India can help with gaining an understanding of the 
ongoing dynamics and developments in the region, and more importantly why non-proliferation 
efforts in this region have failed until this very day. 
As has been elaborated in chapter 4.4., the non-proliferation clause is a foreign policy tool em-
ployed by the EU which aims to mainstream non-proliferation commitments through mixed bilat-
eral agreements with third states. While the track record on the performance and effectiveness of the 
non-proliferation clause as such remains unclear although it has been included in over a hundred 
contractual relationships until today. In the following, the provision and discussion of a dataset as 
depicted by Hertwig will show that while the EU is including the non-proliferation clause in mixed 
agreements, it does so in a very selective manner. The specific nature of the non-proliferation 
clause, namely that it comprises a conditional and a non-conditional element is of the utmost impor-
tance on this note: while the conditional element merely reaffirms previous non-proliferation en-
gagements of signatory states, it is noted that the unconditional element binds both contractual part-
ners to commit themselves more deeply to the international non-proliferation regime. 
In the observed timeframe provided by the available dataset from Hertwig between the years 2003 
and 2008, the non-proliferation clause has been included in mixed agreements with 95 third states. 
This includes partnership and/or cooperation agreements, stabilisation and association agreements 
as well as action plans in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Hertwig 2009: 
294-295): 
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 PCA SAA AP Total 
   ENP Additional  
NP-Clause Tajikistan Albania Egypt India  
 ACP (78) Montenegro Armenia   
  Serbia Azerbaijan   
   Georgia   
   Israel   
   Jordan   
   Lebanon   
   Morocco   
   Moldavia   
   Palestine   
   Tunisia   
   Ukraine   
Total 79 3 12 1 95 
Caption: PCA: Partnership and/or cooperation agreement / SAA: Stabilisation and association agreement / AP: Action 
plan / ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy / ACP: States within the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (78 ACP signatory states) / NP-Clause: Non-proliferation clause (Table 
adopted and translated from: Hertwig 2009: 296) 
As Hertwig argues, the implementation of the non-proliferation clause in the given time frame must 
be regarded as a success due to the vast number of states that reaffirmed their commitments in re-
gard to non-proliferation (Hertwig 2009: 298). However, there are several shortcomings regarding 
this unnecessarily simplifying statement.  
Firstly, it is limited to an optimistic point of view which seems to be adopted from the Council's 
progress reports on the WMD Strategy, which are regularly published since 2003. As Grip argues, 
the high number of cases in which the non-proliferation clause has been included in mixed agree-
ments includes "[...] agreements under negotiation, not just agreements in force, which vastly in-
creases the number of potential 'successes'." (2009: 5). Secondly, none of the inclusions of the non-
proliferation clause made within the ENP framework is legally binding; this is also true for the 
Joint Action Plan (JAP) with India outside the ENP framework. Legal accountability and thus po-
litical leverage to enforce non-proliferation commitments are not provided by these means. Accord-
ingly, in this perspective, the question of whether the included clause in a specific mixed agreement 
is legally binding or not, does not get addressed sufficiently (Grip 2009: 6; see footnote 22). 
Thirdly, as Grip argues, the mere number of agreements is valued higher than the actual policy out-
come in the targeted third state: The policy outcome which results from the implementation of the 
clause is not addressed in the progress reports. Last but not least, it is crucial to stress that the 
Council's status reports do not provide a comprehensive overview on the specific formulation of the 
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clause in these agreements, namely whether the unconditional (and possibly more effective) part of 
the clause has been included or not. Instead, the vague notion that the clause should be "compatible 
with the spirit and the content of the WMD standard clause" appears in a status report from 2009 
and seems to dictate the modus operandi when it comes to formulating the clause (Council 2009b: 
36; quoted in: Grip 2009: 5). It is noted that the non-proliferation clause is formulated in very dif-
ferent ways in the varying agreements. 
Hertwig provides a comprehensive overview of the specific arrangement of the clause in various 
cases of mixed agreements. On the one hand, the legally binding PCAs with Tajikistan and the ACP 
states, as well as the SAAs with Albania, Montenegro and Serbia include the original formulation 
from the specimen text. Due to their legally binding status as well as the complete incorporation of 
the full text (both parts) of the non-proliferation clause, we note that these bilateral agreements 
serve as an effective non-proliferation policy tool; accordingly, the EU is fulfilling its self-defined 
normative role as a foreign policy actor in the area of non-proliferation in these cases. On the other 
hand, the ENP agreements as well as the India-EU JAP account for the whole range of formulations 
between full compliance with the contents, down to a heavy deviation from it. The following over-
view shows that a discrepancy between the specimen text of the non-proliferation clause as pro-
vided in chapter 4.4. and the specific formulations of the clause in mixed agreements exists: 
 Compatibility of deviation 
Action Plan  
ENP 1 2 3 4 5 
Armenia ─ x x x x 
Azerbaijan x x x x x 
Egypt x x x x x 
Georgia ─ x x x x 
Israel x x x x x 
Jordan ─ x x x x 
Lebanon x x x x x 
Morocco ─ x x x x 
Moldavia ─ x x x x 
Palestine ─ x x x x 
Tunisia ─ x x x x 
Ukraine x x x x x 
Additional      
India ─ ─ ─ ─ x 
Caption: 1 Diffusion of WMD is one of the most severe dangers / 2 non-restrictive compliance with commitments from 
international disarmament- and non-proliferation treaties including their implementation on national level / 3 further 
steps towards further multilateral commitments (signing and ratifying/admission, unconditional appliance) / 4 erection 
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of an efficient national system regarding export control including a system of applicable sanctions / 5 continuous and 
frequent political discourse / x deviation of wording is compatible with standard clause / ─ deviation of wording is not 
compatible with standard clause (Table adopted, edited and translated from: Hertwig 2009: 305) 
The specific formulation of the non-proliferation clause found within the India-EU JAP stands out 
of the dataset. While the ENP agreements incorporate most of the formulations from the clause, 
while still not being legally binding, the JAP merely aims to establish a continuous and frequent 
dialogue between the EU and India: 
India and the EU have a shared interest in working towards achieving the goals and objectives of 
universal disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of de-
livery. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its linkages with terrorism poses a 
threat to international peace and security. In this context, we resolve to enhance collective action to 
fight the proliferation of WMD as well as their means of delivery. We believe that our response to 
proliferation challenges requires strengthened multilateral consultations and the pooling of all efforts 
and resources. We agree that effective export control measures for dual use goods can play an impor-
tant role in preventing proliferation, and at the same time, such measures should not hamper interna-
tional co-operation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. We will establish 
a bilateral India-EU Security Dialogue at Senior Official level which will include regular consulta-
tions on global and regional security issues, disarmament and nonproliferation to increase mutual 
understanding and identify possible areas of cooperation. (EU 2005: 5) 
While this formulation may reflect the spirit and the content of the WMD standard clause as noted 
above, it is by no means demanding further non-proliferation commitments from India. The mere 
postulate that both sides have "a shared interest" in further multilateral action towards disarmament 
does not account for any specific plan of policy action. Accordingly, the inclusion of the non-
proliferation clause into the India-EU JAP cannot be regarded as an effective policy tool in regard 
to non-proliferation: it barely accounts for any leverage towards more commitments in non-
proliferation at all on this note. The non-proliferation commitment made at the EU-India summit in 
2005 has been restated at all subsequent EU-India summits: this happened however without specify-
ing sufficiently which policy actions through the "continuous and frequent political discourse" have 
been taking place. Interestingly, there seems to exist a scholarly disagreement on whether the for-
mulation found within the JAP clause can actually be regarded as a non-proliferation clause or not. 
As suggested by the dataset, Hertwig on the one hand counts it in one line with the ENP agree-
ments, although she explicitly states that the wording and thus the message of it does not corre-
spond with the original formulation of the specimen clause. On the other hand, neither Quille nor 
Grip even acknowledge the existence of the India-EU JAP in the context of their research on the 
non-proliferation clause. In an internal note for the use in the European Parliament, Quille evaluates 
the non-proliferation clause against the background of a number of case studies, among which the 
case of India can be found. While simply ignoring the JAP and its regular updates at India-EU 
summits, Quille however refers to the then negotiated Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the 
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EU and India and the possibility of including the clause into this. His evaluation of the clause ends 
with the notion that depending on the specific formulation and ratification of the FTA after the ne-
gotiation procedure, it might take the form of a PCA and thus reach political and legal condition-
ality. This would then include the possibility of placing sanctions in case of non-compliance with 
the specifications of the clause (Quille 2007: 5).  
A very similar standpoint is taken by Grip, who does not refer to the India-EU JAP in her research 
either. She states that during the EU's internal discussion on whether to include the clause into the 
FTA or not, several approaches on the matter have been made towards the Indian government. The 
EU's initial idea in regard to the FTA was namely to renew the old existing cooperation agreement 
with India from 1994. In the new PCA, political clauses and legal links would have to be included, 
which would have inevitably included the non-proliferation clause with all of its specifications 
(Grip 2009: 10). If this would have been achieved, it would have been likely that the non-
proliferation clause in the India-EU FTA/PCA would have achieved similar success as reached with 
Tajikistan, the ACP-states, Albania, Montenegro and Serbia, who are nowadays all part of the non-
proliferation regime since the ratification of their respective agreements which include the clause. 
However, eventually due to pressure from the Indian government, the FTA was drafted without 
political conditionality and thus it does not include the non-proliferation clause (Grip 2009: 11). 
Conclusively, it is noted that while some initial efforts in regard to non-proliferation policy towards 
India have been made by means of the India-EU JAP, the specific formulation of the non-
proliferation clause in the agreement is by no means comprehensive. The discrepancy towards the 
specimen text is obvious. Further efforts to include India sufficiently into the non-proliferation re-
gime by means of the FTA have failed due to India's bearish attitude and its unwillingness to com-
mit itself to the international non-proliferation regime. While within the EU numerous positions and 
statements on the need of further participation of India in the non-proliferation regime were made 
28
, the ratification of the FTA without political and legal conditionality eventually took place, which 
also excluded the non-proliferation clause. It is important to stress that the exclusion of the non-
proliferation clause in the FTA has stirred up major concerns within the EU. Annalisa Gianella, the 
then Personal Representative on non-proliferation publicly stated that leaving the clause out would 
lead to a "terrible double standard" and that  
                                                          
28
 such as: The European Parliament "[u]rges India, together with Pakistan and Israel, to become parties to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is an irreplaceable multilateral instrument for maintaining and con-
solidating international peace, security and stability and establishes a legal framework to prevent further proliferation of 
nuclear weapons; [...]" (EP 2005: Article 87) 
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[i]f we were to adopt for India an approach different from the approach we adopt with other coun-
tries, I think we would abandon altogether the idea of having a WMD clause with third countries. 
(Reuters 2007; quoted in: Grip 2009: 11) 
Grip furthermore marks the case of India as the first "tough" case for the EU's non-proliferation 
policy (2009: 11). Not only is India a vast emerging and heavily protected market, but also is it one 
of the only nine remaining states which has not ratified the CTBT; nor is India part of the NPT 
while being a nuclear power. As Grip points out, India is "[...] a controversial and high-profile case 
from the point of view of non-proliferation." (ibid.). Accordingly, the question of why the EU has 
not managed to push the issue of non-proliferation in the FTA negotiations arises: 
The course of the FTA negotiations with India has given rise to speculation that the EU has, in the 
interests of trade, abandoned its principle that all new cooperation arrangements with third countries 
must be tied to non-proliferation commitments when dealing with its first difficult case. (Grip 2009: 
11) 
These points being taken, it is sensible to return to the theoretical discussion of this thesis. As the 
deliberations above have shown, we note that the EU is selectively including the non-proliferation 
clause in various differing formulations in bilateral mixed agreements. While numerous cases exist 
in which the non-proliferation clause has been included in mixed agreements and served as a suc-
cessful policy measure for a rapprochement of a number of states towards the international non-
proliferation regime, the case of India shows that double standards from the side of the EU may 
exist. As Quille points out, 
[t]he introduction of non-proliferation clauses in mixed agreements with third states is an indication 
that the policy area is being taken seriously by the European Union in support of its new security and 
non-proliferation strategies. However, the challenge remains in applying the clause consistently and 
deciding in advance which states merit the full clause or just the essential element. This will raise 
questions about the European Union's standards in its relations with certain countries and not others. 
(Quille 2005: 5) 
In the following, the findings from the case study on the EU's non-proliferation actions towards 
India will be applied onto the theory testing exercise. Although the EU accounts for normative for-
eign policy goals and means, its inconsistency in non-proliferation actions can be exemplified 
through the exclusion of an adequate formulation of the non-proliferation clause in two bilateral 
agreements with India. Neither the JAP, nor the FTA demand even elementary commitments of 
India to engage itself in the international non-proliferation regime. As will be argued in the follow-
ing chapter, the EU's conscious decision not to include the non-proliferation clause in a regional 
context with a high proliferation risk inevitably undermine the recognition of the EU's role as an 
actor in the international non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, by means of these findings, a refu-
tation of Manners' theoretical concept of NPE in the specific foreign policy area of non-
proliferation will take place. 
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5.3. The EU's inconsistency as an actor in the international non-proliferation regime and its 
implications for the notion of 'Normative Power Europe' 
The findings from the case study suggest that the EU is not a coherent normative foreign policy 
actor in the policy field of non-proliferation. As has been argued in chapters 4.2. - 4.4., the EU ac-
counts for a normative foundation which poses the basis of its non-proliferation policies: the EU's 
normative foreign policy goals and means in the area of non-proliferation are oriented towards 
achieving milieu goals in the same policy area. The unconditional support of the international non-
proliferation regimes under the auspices of the UN, various self-formulated action plans as well as 
applicable policy measures and tools, which aim to approximate third states towards the interna-
tional non-proliferation regimes, attest to the existence of the EU's milieu goals. Accordingly, the 
EU accounts for a solid and convincing initial basis for policy action in the policy field of non-
proliferation. However, according to Tocci's analytical framework on who can be regarded as a 
normative foreign policy actor, the normative foreign policy impact of a given actor must conform 
to the normative foreign policy goals and means. As has been discussed above in the case study of 
chapter 5.2., the EU's inconsistency in coherently applying the non-proliferation clause in mixed 
bilateral agreements causes unease among EU policy-makers. It furthermore induces scholarly criti-
cism on the EU's actorness in the policy field of non-proliferation. Connected to this, the research of 
this thesis aimed to discuss the implications of the findings on the EU's inconsistency as a non-
proliferation actor for IR theory on the EU. 
In the following namely, the results from the case study will be aligned to the theoretical framework 
of Normative Power Europe, as depicted in chapter 2.1.. A subsumption towards the explanatory 
power of NPE is necessary, as the findings from the case study have shown. While the EU may be 
considered a foreign policy actor of its own kind due to its specific institutional and ideational setup, 
it will be argued that in the conduct of foreign policy the EU can be considered a normal actor.  
In the centre of the theoretical treatise on NPE stands the notion that the EU bases its foreign policy 
on its norms and values, and that it aims to project these onto third states. In Manners' perspective 
on the EU's actorness in external relations, the EU's actions do neither relate to thinking in West-
phalian terms of nation state interest, nor to a Weberian conception of A) being able to make B) 
what he or she would otherwise not have done. It is again noted that in Manners' understanding of 
the EU, it "[...]  has evolved into a hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance 
which transcends Westphalian norms." (Manners 2002: 240; ref. to: King 1999: 313). On this note, 
it is not sensible to compare the foreign policy actions of the EU with the ones of state actors. The 
research of this thesis has consciously avoided this possible research perspective on comparing the 
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EU with state actors. Instead, it has concentrated on the actual policy actions, as suggested by Diez, 
in order to gain a broader understanding of the EU's actions in a specific policy area (2005: 616). 
Following the research perspective which exclusively sets its focus on the goals, means and impacts 
of foreign policy actions of the EU in the field of non-proliferation, we must note that the EU is not 
coherently applying its normative reasoning when conducting foreign policy. 
While the EU might be a different foreign policy actor than state actors, which pursues normatively 
defined milieu goals rather than possession goals, it is still embedded in the international political 
system and shares one environment with state actors. On this note, it is important to stress that hav-
ing normative foreign policy goals and means is not enough to be a comprehensive normative for-
eign policy actor; having normative foreign policy goals e.g., is not an exclusive trait of the EU. In 
fact, most foreign policy actors refer to their own value- and norm-system in order to legitimate 
their actions. Instead, according to Tocci's view, a truly normative foreign policy actor must incor-
porate all three traits simultaneously: the goals, the means, as well as the impact. Only by following 
and insisting on the path of the consistent normative foreign policy actor, the EU could actually 
correspond to the tenets that NPE attribute towards the EU. 
As the research of this thesis has shown, this is not the case in the policy field of non-proliferation. 
The selective manner in which the EU is formulating and including the non-proliferation clause in 
mixed bilateral agreements shows that role conflicts in the EU's role-set are likely to emerge. The 
most likely one in the case study of the EU's non-proliferation policy towards India is the conflict 
between the EU's roles as an economic, respectively as a non-proliferation actor. In other words, we 
note that within the limits of the case study, the EU has substituted its milieu goals related to non-
proliferation with possession goals in form of a Free Trade Agreement with India. Instead of coher-
ently including an adequate formulation of the non-proliferation clause which reflects the EU's mi-
lieu goals in the policy area, the clause gets either reformulated and mitigated, or completely ex-
cluded as the dataset and the case study have shown. This knowledge has been attained by means of 
the conducted case study. 
In this respect, the findings from the case study must be regarded as crucial to the research outcome 
of the thesis. While the datasets compiled by Hertwig shows that the EU has included the non-
proliferation clause in modified forms in various bilateral mixed agreements, only by means of the 
conducted case study the theory testing exercise of this thesis could take place. 
The research of this thesis does not argue against the ideational power of norms; neither does this 
thesis aim to diminish the importance of the EU as an actor in the international political system. 
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Without norms connected to non-proliferation, the existent non-proliferation regime would have 
never come into being and an uncontrolled spread of WMD would have been unavoidable. How-
ever, conducting research on foreign policy outcome or impact 
29
 necessarily has to rely on policy 
actions of actors in the international political system. While the authors of this thesis agrees with 
Manners on the notion that the EU is in its setup something different than state actors, the restraints 
stemming from having to deal with other foreign policy actors limit the impact of EU policies. As 
has been argued in the treatise on Tocci, a foreign policy actor can only affect a foreign policy out-
come in a limited way. The outcome or impact is dependent on time, context and other actors. 
The specific arrangement of the international non-proliferation regime in connection to an internal 
role conflict necessitated the EU to make compromises in the formulation and inclusion of the non-
proliferation clause in mixed agreements: this has lead to an inconsistency in the EU's role as a non-
proliferation actor. This has been proven by both, the datasets compiled by Hertwig on a more gen-
eral note, as well as by the conducted case study. However, as Whitman points out, being an " 
'[i]nconsistent' normative power: [is] a real 'contradiction in terms' " (Whitman 2013: 182). 
Accordingly, we state that in the specific policy field of non-proliferation of WMD and in the light 
of the case study of this thesis, the EU is not a consistent normative foreign policy actor: even more, 
in this specific policy field, the EU is not a normative power. To the same extent that Manners' re-
search on NPE is valid in terms of the foreign policy impact in regard to the abolition of the death 
penalty, the research of this thesis has shown that in the policy field of non-proliferation, Manners' 
conception of NPE is not valid. The dataset compiled by Hertwig and the case study of the EU's 
non-proliferation policy towards India has sufficiently dismissed the notion of 'Normative Power 
Europe' in the chosen policy context. As Manners himself points out, case studies can verify or fal-
sify the findings of research programmes connected to theory development. The test case of this 
thesis has falsified the notion of NPE in the chosen policy field; yet, more case studies concerning 
different policy fields may yet restate the explanatory power of NPE. 
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 Even in terms of achieving milieu goals such as including more states into the international non-proliferation regime 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis is concluded by reviewing the research objectives, as outlined in chapters 1.1. and 1.2., 
against the background of the conducted research. The first and foremost research objective of this 
thesis was to test Manners' theory framework of NPE and whether it accounts for explanatory 
power in the context of the EU's actions in the policy area of non-proliferation. 
In order to set an appropriate theoretical focus for the discussion of the research question, it was 
deemed necessary to depict a coherent and comprehensive overview of Manners' conception of 
NPE, as well as the current academic discourse on it. On this note, a discussion aimed to take place 
at which end a confirmation or refutation of theoretical tenets of NPE stood. In order to engage in 
the discussion of the research question and on NPE, a theoretical subsumption took place. Firstly, 
Tocci's analytical framework of how to depict a normative foreign policy actor helped to differ be-
tween the EU's normative foreign policy goals, means and impact. These were all discussed against 
the background of the EU's institutional development as a non-proliferation actor in the analytical 
part of this thesis. Secondly, role theory as depicted by Elgström helped to prepare the discussion on 
the specific actorness of the EU as a foreign policy actor, and more specifically, point out that the 
EU accounts for a role-set of different employable roles in the conduct of foreign affairs. 
Given these auxiliary means for the theoretical discussion, an excursus into available methodology 
for discussing the research question took place. Due to the fact that Manners himself selected case 
study methodology for the depiction of NPE, the same methodological means were selected for this 
thesis, in order to verify or falsify NPE in a chosen policy field. According to Manners' methodol-
ogy, conducting a single case study in a chosen policy field is a sufficient theory testing exercise. 
Nevertheless, a coherent and tailor-made research design had to be depicted with an in-depth com-
position of the case study and its classification into the EU's foreign affairs. The discussion on case 
study methodology and the research design is heavily aligned towards George's and Bennett's vol-
ume on Case Study and Theory Development from 2005.  
Subsequent to the methodological outline of this thesis, a contextualisation of the existent interna-
tional legal framework on non-proliferation, the institutional development of the EU as a foreign 
policy and non-proliferation actor, as well as the EU's formulation of policy goals and means in 
non-proliferation took place. These elaborations were necessary in order to approach the case study 
of this thesis and thus the analytical discussion on the actorness of the EU as a non-proliferation 
actor. More specifically, an international non-proliferation regime against WMD and their deploy-
ment exists under the auspices of the UN. Furthermore, the specific institutional outline of the EU's 
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non-proliferation policy formulations and measures, among which the non-proliferation clause can 
be found, was illustrated. While the various international treaties within the regime vary in their 
arrangement, they nevertheless depict the most universalised basis of coordinated action against the 
spread of WMD. This outline is crucially important for the analytical discussion of this thesis, as the 
EU unconditionally binds its non-proliferation efforts to the existent international non-proliferation 
regime.  
A coherent research framework stood at the end of these elaborations, which included all necessary 
theoretical tenets for discussing normative foreign policy as well as a delineation of the institutional 
development and current setup of the EU in non-proliferation policy. This research framework initi-
ated the analysis of the specific actorness of the EU in the chosen policy field. Like any other for-
eign policy actor, the EU accounts for a specific role set of available roles in foreign policy. De-
pending on context and time, a foreign policy actor may choose to employ on or another role. These 
roles are often based on a normative foundation and a related rationale in planning policies. How-
ever, due to the complexity of foreign affairs with its unmanageable multiplicity of actors and their 
respective diverging opinions, role conflicts within the role set of a given foreign policy actor are 
frequent. Although an actor may base its foreign policy formulations and goals on its own norms 
and values, the conduct of foreign policy often leads to an inconsistency between goals, actions and 
impact, as argued by Tocci. Accordingly, while the EU is different from other foreign policy actors 
in its institutional setup, it still shares the same environment with them and most importantly, it has 
to deal with them. 
Subsequently to the outline of the research framework, the actual case study and thereby the theory 
testing exercise of this thesis took place. By means of a dataset of the EU's implementation and ex-
clusion of the non-proliferation clause, as well as the case-study of the EU's non-proliferation policy 
towards India, Manners' theoretical notion of NPE was refuted in the specific policy area of non-
proliferation, in the light of the conducted case study. The EU's actual and conscious decision to 
deal with other actors in the policy field of non-proliferation has lead to an ambiguous track-record. 
As the discussion of the provided dataset by Hertwig has shown, the EU included its non-
proliferation clause in a very distinct manner. Initially, the clause was meant to be included in all 
mixed bilateral agreements. Nevertheless, we note that not only does the specific formulation of the 
clause diverge in different mixed bilateral agreements, but also does the EU exclude the clause de-
pending on the negotiation process with a third state. The research of this thesis suggests that the 
decision of the EU to exclude the non-proliferation clause in mixed agreements with India is due to 
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a role conflict within the EU. The fact that the EU pulled through a Free Trade Agreement with 
India without including the clause supports this assumption. 
Accordingly, the research of this thesis posits the following: while the EU is an integrated foreign 
policy and non-proliferation actor, whose normative foundation corresponds with its available pol-
icy tools and means, it is not consistently adhering to its self-chosen standards and goals. Given the 
case of India, which is a crucial test case in terms non-proliferation due to its refusal to take part in 
the international non-proliferation regime, the EU has abandoned its role as a non-proliferation ac-
tor in exchange for economic benefits. Instead of pursuing milieu goals which aim to alter the inter-
national non-proliferation regime 
30
, short term possession goals were chosen. In this respect, we 
state that the EU is not a coherent normative foreign policy actor in the policy area of non-
proliferation; correspondingly, we state that the EU is not a normative power in non-proliferation. 
As has been argued above, the research of this thesis fully endorses the initial research focus of 
Manners' on the EU as a foreign policy actor. Due to the fact that the EU is not a state actor, we 
note that it requires a specific research perspective. The EU does not only differ from nation states 
in its institutional setup. Even more, it accounts for normative foreign policy means which corre-
spond with its normative foreign policy goals. While the research of this thesis does not compare 
the EU to other state actors, the examination of the EU's track record in non-proliferation policy 
nevertheless suggests that the EU is no different than other policy actors in the same field. To the 
same extent that role conflicts take place within the role sets of nation states, they also take place 
within the EU's role set. In the case of the EU's non-proliferation policy and in the light of the se-
lected case study, Manners' theoretical conception of NPE has been refuted. 
To the same extent that these findings are valid for the policy field of non-proliferation, the picture 
might look quite different in other policy areas. Accordingly, an extensive research programme 
which would conduct case studies in different policy areas is desirable. Only on this note, a far-
ranging understanding of the relation between the EU's norms and its policy actions can emerge. 
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 e.g. through including more state actors into the regime 
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Anyway, I'm sort of glad they've got the atomic bomb invented. 
If there's ever another war, I'm going to sit right the hell on 
top of it. I'll volunteer for it, I swear to God I will. 
- Jerome David Salinger, The catcher in the rye, 1951, chapter 18 
